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AFFIRMATIVE REFRACTION: 
GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER THROUGH THE 
LENS OF THE CASE OF THE SPELUNCEAN 
EXPLORERS* 
PaulL. Caron** 
Rafael Gely*** 
What can a fifty year-old hypothetical about human cannibal-
ism concocted by the late Lon Fuller' teach us about the Supreme 
Court's recent foray into the affirmative action debate in twenty-
first century America?2 Indeed, what can a tax law professor and a 
labor law professor add to the cacophony of voices of leading con-
stitutional law scholars on the Court's most important pro-
nouncement on race in a generation?3 We make a rather modest 
claim, based on teaching both of these cases in our one-week In-
troduction to Law classes for incoming first year students,4 that a 
helpful way to view Grutter v. Bollinger is through the lens of The 
* © 2004, Paul L. Caron and Rafael Gcly. We want to thank Chris Bryant, 
Charles Craver, Lonny Hoffman, Stewart Schwab, Peggie Smith, Michael Solimine, and 
Joe Tomain for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Special thanks to 
Travis Lcnkncr. 
** Charles Hartsock Professor of Law and Director of Faculty Projects, University 
of Cincinnati College of Law. 
*** Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
I. Lon L. Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV. 616 (1949). 
2. This Article focuses on the case involving the usc of race in law school admis-
sions policies at the University of Michigan, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2(X)3), 
and not the companion case involving the usc of race in undergraduate admissions poli-
cies at Michigan, Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
3. We come to this task not entirely unequipped: one of us has recently taken an 
unorthodox tack in writing about a legal issue of great public interest, Paul L. Caron, The 
Federal Tax Implications of Bush v. Gore, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 749 (2001), while the other 
has plumbed some of the jurisprudential underpinnings of this Article, Rafael Gcly & 
Leonard Bierman, Labor Law Access Rules and Stare Decisis: Developing A Planned-
Parenthood-Based Model of Reform, 20 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 138 (1999); Rafael 
Gcly, Of Sinking and Escalating: A (Somewhat) New Look at Stare Decisis, 60 U. PITI. L. 
REV. 89 (1998). See also Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gcly, What Law Schools Can Learn 
from Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics, 82 TEXAS L. REV. 1483 (2004). 
4. The course is designed to equip incoming students with the analytical tools and 
framework needed for success in the first year of law school. See www.law.uc.edu/courses. 
5. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). 
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Case of the Speluncean Explorers.6 Legal scholars have issued 
dozens of new "opinions" on the hypothetical legal issue in that 
case to take into account contemporary legal theories developed 
in the past fifty-five years.7 This Article is the first to take the op-
posite approach8 and view a real-life legal issue through the eyes 
of the fictional Justices in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers. 
This Article also is the first to consider the applicability of Fuller's 
hypothetical outside the context of statutory construction. 
We argue that the various opinions in Grutter find their in-
tellectual forebears in the opinions in The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers. For all the heat generated by Grutter, the opinions 
merely mark another way station in the centuries-old debate 
among competing philosophies of the role of law and govern-
ment. By examining the Grutter opinions in the context of this 
rich jurisprudential tradition, we hope to elevate much of the 
current debate about the case, in which labels like "liberal" and 
"conservative" are hurled about like epithets, toward a more so-
phisticated understanding of how the various Justices' ap-
proaches embody alternative views of the proper judicial func-
tion in our democracy. 
Parts I and II of this Article describe the facts and opinions 
in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers and Grutter. Part III 
then draws some rather surprising connections between these 
very different cases by using what we call a "jurisprudence of 
humility." We explain how the disparate opinions in Grutter can 
be understood in the context of the issues addressed by the 
mythical justices in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers over 
half a century ago. Although a jurisprudence of humility does 
not make it any easier to decide difficult issues like the constitu-
6. Fuller noted that his hypothetical could be used to "bring[] into common focus 
certain divergent philosophies of law and government." Fuller, supra note 1, at 645. 
7. See PETER SUBER, TilE CASE OF TilE SI'ELUNCEAN EXPLORERS: NINE NEW 
OPINIONS (1998); Anthony D'Amato, The Speluneean Explorers-Further Opinions, 32 
STAN. L. REv. 467 (1980) (three new opinions); Symposium, The Case of the Spelunccan 
Explorers: A Fiftieth Anniversary Symposium, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1834-1923 (1999) (six 
new opinions) [hereinafter Harvard Spcluncean Symposium]; Symposium, 61 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1731-1811 (1993) (seven new opinions) [hereinafter George Washington 
Spelunccan Symposium]. 
8. Cf J.B. Ruhl, The Case of the Speluncean Polluters: Six Themes of Environ-
mental Law, Policy, and Ethics, 27 ENYTL. L. 343 (1997) (using The Case of the Spe-
luncean Explorers, with seven opinions by different hypothetical judges deciding hypo-
thetical legal issue in a futuristic mythical jurisdiction, to explore contrasting 
jurisprudential theories of environmental law); Alexander M. Sanders, Jr., Newgarth Re-
~·isited: Mrs. Robii!Son's Case, 49 S.C. L. REV. 407 (1998) (using The Case of the Spe-
luncean Explorers, with five opinions by different hypothetical judges, to decide a hypo-
thetical case involving the title character in Paul Simon's song Mrs. Robinson). 
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tionality of racial classifications in university admissions or the 
applicability of a murder statute to stranded cave explorers who 
kill and eat a colleague, this framework illuminates how different 
theories of the proper role of courts affect the decisions made by 
judges. A better appreciation of these theories, in turn, will help 
inform lawyers who practice before those judges and law profes-
sors who write about them. 
I. THE CASE OF THE SPELUNCEAN EXPLORERS 
In the faraway year of 4299 in the mythical jurisdiction of 
Newgarth,9 five members of an amateur society of cave-
explorers (the Speluncean Society) are trapped after a landslide 
covers the opening of a cave they are exploring. 10 A frantic res-
cue effort is launched,11 but the explorers' provisions will be de-
pleted before the rescuers can reach them. On the twentieth day 
of the ordeal, rescuers make radio contact and tell the explorers 
that it will take at least ten days to free them. Medical experts 
inform the explorers that there is "little possibility" they will 
survive the ten days without food. When asked by Richard 
Whetmore, one of the explorers, the experts report that four of 
them could survive if they kill and eat the flesh of the fifth mem-
ber of the group. When Whetmore asks whether they should 
draw lots to pick the explorer to be killed and eaten, the medical 
experts refuse to answer, and Whetmore's requests for guidance 
from judges, government officials, and clergy go unheeded. 
Three days later, Whetmore is killed and eaten by the other four 
explorers after they draw lots by throwing dice. 12 
9. Fuller chose this year because "the centuries which separate us [in 1 949] from 
the year 4300 [the year of the Newgarth Supreme Court's decision in the case] arc 
roughly equal to those that have passed since the Age of Pericles." Fuller, supra note 1, 
at 645 (Truepenny, C.J.). 
10. The Case of the Speluncean Explorers is drawn from two famous old cases: Re· 
gina v. Dudley & Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (after twenty days at sea on a lifeboat, 
defendants kill and cat youngest person on boat; defendants convicted of murder but 
death sentences commuted); and United States v. Holmes, 26 F. Cas. 360 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 
1842) (defendant crew member of ship that sank threw several passengers out of life 
boat; defendant convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to six months' imprisonment). 
II. The rescue was difficult because of the cave's location in a remote and isolated 
region. The rescue work was slowed by several new landslides, one of which killed ten of 
the rescuers. Fuller, supra note 1, at 616. 
12. Although Whctmore first raised the prospect of cannibalism and proposed 
choosing the unlucky person by drawing lots, he later changed his mind and preferred to 
wait another week "before embracing an expedient so frightful and odious." !d. at 618. 
The other explorers considered this a breach of faith on Whctmore's part and proceeded 
to cast the dice. One of them threw the dice on behalf of Whetmore, who stated that he 
did not object to the fairness of the throw. !d. 
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After the four survivors are rescued nine days later, they are 
indicted and tried for murder under a statute providing in its en-
tirety: "Whoever shall willfully take the life of another shall be 
punishable by death." 13 The jury issues a special verdict finding 
the facts as outlined above, and the trial judge finds the defen-
dants guilty under the statute and imposes a mandatory death 
sentence.14 The jury and trial judge join in requesting the Chief 
Executive of Newgarth to commute the defendants' sentences to 
six months' imprisonment. 15 Defendants appeal to the five-
member Supreme Court of Newgarth while the clemency re-
quest is pending. 
A. JUSTICES VOTING TO AFFIRM THE CONVICTIONS 
1. Chief Justice Truepenny 
Chief Justice Truepenny votes to uphold the verdict because 
the statute "permits of no exception applicable to this case, how-
ever our sympathies may incline us to make allowance for the 
tragic situation in which these men found themselves." 16 But the 
Chief Justice also urges the Court to join in the clemency petition 
to the Chief Executive. 17 In this way, "justice will be accomplished 
without impairing either the letter or spirit of our statutes and 
without offering any encouragement for the disregard of law." 18 
2. Justice Keen 
Justice Keen provides the second vote to affirm the convic-
tions. At the outset of his opinion, Justice Keen quickly disposes 
of two issues that he says are not the province of the Court: 
(1) executive clemency19 and (2) morality- "whether what these 
men did was 'right' or 'wrong.'" Instead, the sole issue is one of 
statutory construction, and Justice Keen concludes that "any 
candid observer, content to extract from these words their natu-
13. /d. at 619. 
14. A death sentence is mandatory in Ncwgarth for the crime of murder. /d. 
15. /d. 
16. /d. at 619 (Truepenny, C.J.). 
17. Chid Justice Trucpenny notes that there is "every reason to believe" that the 
clemency requests will be heeded by the Chief Executive. /d. 
18. /d. 
19. Although Justice Keen rejects the call for executive clemency, he notes that if 
he were the Chief Executive rather than a Supreme Court Justice, he would go further 
than the six-months' imprisonment sought in the clemency petition and instead "pardon 
these men altogether, since I believe that they have already suffered enough to pay for 
any offense they may have committed." /d. at 632 (Keen, J.). 
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ral meaning, would concede at once that these defendants did 
'willfully take the life' of Roger Whetmore."20 Justice Keen chas-
tises his colleagues for their "failure to distinguish the legal from 
the moral aspects of this case."21 He "bluntly" accuses his fellow 
Justices of subordinating "the law of the land" to their own 
"conceptions of morality."22 
Justice Keen recounts the civil war fought in Newgarth cen-
turies earlier as a result of "an unseemly struggle for power" be-
tween the judicial branch and the legislative and executive 
branches, which established the supremacy of the legislature.23 
He, like Justice Tatting, sharply criticizes Justice Foster for dis-
regarding the clear language of the statute in order to further its 
purported purpose of deterrence. According to Justice Keen, the 
statute at issue here, like most if not all statutes, has multiple 
purposes. It is thus, a canard to argue that courts may fill in the 
gap in the statute or make corrections in the legislative design. 
Instead, the Court's role is to interpret the statute "in accor-
dance with its plain meaning without reference to our personal 
desires or our individual conceptions of justice. "24 
Justice Keen also takes issue with Justice Foster and Justice 
Tatting's reliance on an exception to the murder statute, created 
by an earlier decision of the Court on the theory that a defen-
dant who acts in self-defense does not act "willfully." Justice 
Keen contends that the exception is not relevant here because it 
applies only when the defendant resists a threat to his own life, 
and "Whetmore made no threat against the lives of these defen-
dants."25 Justice Keen concludes that his approach provides the 
best result in this case and leads to the sounder administration of 
justice in the long run. "[W]e would have inherited a better legal 
system from our forefathers if [these] principles had been ob-
served from the beginning. For example, with respect to the ex-
cuse of self-defense, if our courts had stood steadfast on the lan-
guage of the statute the result would undoubtedly have been a 
legislative revision of it. "26 
20. /d. 
21. /d. 
22. /d. at 632. 
23. /d. at 633. 
24. /d. 
25. /d. at 636. 
26. /d. at 637. 
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B. JUSTICES VOTING TO REVERSE THE CONVICTIONS 
1. Justice Foster 
Justice Foster first criticizes Chief Justice Truepenny's ex-
hortation to seek clemency as "an expedient at once so sordid 
and so obvious": 
I believe something more is on trial in this case than the fate 
of these unfortunate explorers; that is the law of our Com-
monwealth. If this Court declares that under our law these 
men have committed a crime, then our law is itself convicted 
in the tribunal of common sense .... For us to assert that the 
law we uphold and expound compels us to a conclusion we 
are ashamed of, and from which we can only escape by ap-
pealing to a dispensation resting within the personal whim of 
the Executive, seems to me to amount to an admission that 
the law of this Commonwealth no longer pretends to incorpo-
. • 27 
rate J ust1ce. 
Justice Foster then offers two independent justifications in 
support of his view that the law does not compel "the monstrous 
conclusion that these men are murderers. "2 First, the statute 
and related case law do not apply because the explorers' horren-
dous circumstances placed them in a "state of nature," and the 
explorers thus were subject only to natural law. Under the natu-
ral law precept of freedom of contract, the explorers' compact 
was justifiable to enable the four to survive at the cost of the 
one. 9 Second, the statute must be interpreted in light of its pur-
pose of deterring murder, and this purpose is not served in con-
victing the defendants because they were justified in taking 
Whetmore's life to ensure their own survival.3 
Although Justice Foster professes fealty to the principle that 
the Court is bound by statutes and is thus subservient to the duly 
expressed will of the legislature, he distinguishes "intelligent" 
from "unintelligent" obedience.31 Justice Foster emphasizes that 
"[n]o superior wants a servant who lacks the capacity to read be-
tween the lines."32 Justice Foster offers two examples: "The stu-
pidest housemaid knows that when she is told 'to peel the soup 
27. !d. at 620. 
28. !d. 
29. !d. at 620-23. 
30. !d. at 624-25. 
31. !d. at 625. 
32. !d. 
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and skim the potatoes' her mistress does not mean what she says. 
She also knows that when her master tells her to 'drop every-
thing and come running' he has overlooked the possibility that 
she is at the moment in the act of rescuing the baby from the rain 
barrel. Surely we have a right to expect the same modicum of in-
telligence from the judiciary. "33 He thus concludes that the "cor-
rection of obvious legislative errors or oversights is not to sup-
plant the legislative will, but to make that will effective."34 
2. Justice Handy 
Justice Handy takes a pragmatic, common-sense approach 
in providing the second vote to reverse the convictions. Justice 
Handy notes that he has become "more and more perplexed at 
men's refusal to agply their common sense to problems of law 
and government." The question on appeal, he writes, is one of 
"practical wisdom, to be exercised in a context, not of abstract 
theory, but of realities."36 He chides his colleagues for throwing 
"an obscuring curtain of legalisms" at what is at bottom a simple 
case. For example, he criticizes the "learned disquisitions on the 
distinction between positive law and the law of nature, the lan-
guage of the statute and the purpose of the statute, judicial func-
tions and executive functions, judicial legislation and legislative 
legislation. "37 Justice Handy reminds his colleagues of the dan-
ger of getting "lost in the patterns of our thought and forget that 
these patterns often cast not the slightest shadow on the outside 
world."38 In Justice Handy's view, courts derive their legitimacy 
by bending to popular will, and the Court here should follow the 
poll reporting that 90 percent of the public believes that the de-
fendants should be pardoned or given a token punishment. Jus-
tice Handy latches onto Justice Foster's statutorr. purpose argu-
ment to provide the legal rationale for this result. 9 
Justice Handy concludes his opinion with two lessons drawn 
from his personal experience. First, he dismisses the possibility 
of clemency based on gossip from his wife's niece, who is a 
33. !d. at 625-26. 
34. !d. at 626; see also id. at624 ("[A] man may break the letter of the law without 
breaking the law itself."). 
35. !d. at 643. 
36. !d. at 637-38 (Handy, 1.). 
37. !d. at637. 
38. !d. at 642. 
39. !d. at 640. 
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friend of the Chief Executive's secretary.40 According to Justice 
Handy, he shared this information with his colleagues. This ex-
plained Chief Justice Truepenny's "flap[ping) his judicial robes" 
to encourage the Chief Executive to grant clemency, "[Justice) 
Foster's feat of levitation by which a whole library of law books 
was lifted from the shoulders of these defendants," and "[Jus-
tice] Keen emulat[ing) Pooh-Bah in the ancient comedy by step-
ping to the other side of the stage to address a few remarks to 
the Executive 'in my capacity as a private citizen. "'41 Second, 
Justice Handy compares this case to the first case he heard as a 
trial judge, in which he was "widely approved by the press and 
public opinion" for employing his common sense and avoiding 
the many "perplexing" legal issues raised in the case.42 
C. THE DECIDING VOTE: JUSTICE TATTING 
With the Court deadlocked, the deciding vote falls to Justice 
Tatting. His initial opinion is written after the first opinions to 
affirm (Chief Justice Truepenny) and reverse (Justice Foster). 
He finds himself "torn between sympathy for [the defendants) 
and a feeling of abhorrence and disgust at the monstrous act 
they committed. "43 He had hoped to be able to "put these con-
tradictory emotions to one side as irrelevant, and to decide the 
case on the basis of a convincing and logical demonstration of 
the result demanded by our law."44 But he is not convinced by 
the arguments on either side. 
Justice Tatting rejects both of Justice Foster's rationales for 
reversing the convictions. The question of the boundary of a 
state of nature is intractable, and in any event Justice Tatting is 
unpersuaded that the law applicable in such a state should per-
mit the law of contracts to override the law of murder.45 The 
purposive analysis is unavailing where, as here, there are several 
purposes served by the criminal statute (retribution and rehabili-
tation in addition to deterrence ).46 Moreover, the self-defense 
rationale is flawed because the defendants here acted willfully 
and deliberately in planning and executing Whetmore's killing. 
Justice Tatting invokes the case of Jean Claude Valjean of Les 
40. /d. at 642. 
41. /d. at 642-43. 
42. /d. at 643-44. 
43. /d. at 626 (Tatting, J.). 
44. /d. 
45. /d. at 627-28. 
46. !d. at 628-29. 
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Miserables in arguing that impending starvation neither excuses 
Valjean's stealing of a loaf of bread nor the defendants' killing of 
Whetmore.47 Justice Tatting envisions "a quagmire of hidden dif-
ficulties" if the self-defense exception is applied.48 Justice Tatting 
ultimately rejects Justice Foster's arguments in favor of reversal 
as intellectually unsound and approaching mere rationalization.49 
Yet Justice Tatting also is repelled at the prospect of affirm-
ing the convictions. He complains: "[T]he more I examine this 
case and think about it, .... [ m ]y mind becomes entangled in the 
meshes of the very nets I throw out for my own rescue. I find that 
almost every consideration that bears on the decision of the case 
is counterbalanced by an opposing consideration leading in the 
opposite direction. "50 After expressing regret that the prosecutor 
did not simply refuse to indict the defendants, Justice Tatting 
takes the "unprecedented" step of withdrawing from the case. 51 
After the second opinions to affirm (Justice Keen) and re-
verse (Justice Handy) are proffered, Chief Justice True penny 
asks Justice Tatting to reconsider. Justice Tatting declines: 
"[A]fter hearing these opinions I am greatly strengthened in my 
conviction that I ought not to participate in the decision of this 
case. "52 As a result, the Court is evenly divided, the convictions 
are affirmed, and the executions are set for April 2, 4300.53 
II. GRUTTER v. BOLLINGER 
In the not-so-distant year of 1992 in the non-mythical state 
of Michigan, the dean of the University of Michigan Law School 
charged a faculty committee with crafting a written admissions 
policy to implement the goals of attracting "a mix of students 
with varying backgrounds and experiences who will respect and 
learn from each other"54 while complying with the Supreme 
Court's Bakke decision.55 The policy developed by the commit-
tee, and later unanimously approved by the Law School faculty, 
combined an assessment of academic ability "with a flexible as-
47. /d. at 629-30. 
48. /d. at 630. 
49. /d. at 631. 
50. /d. ("My brother Foster has not furnished to me, nor can I discover for myself, 
any formula capable of resolving the equivocations that beset me on all sides."). 
51. /d. 
52. /d. at 644. 
53. /d. at 645. 
54. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 314 (2003). 
55. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
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sess~ent of applicants_' talents, experiences, and Rotential 'to 
contnbute to the learnmg of those around them."' 6 The policy 
directed admissions officials to consider, as predictors of aca-
demic success, the applicant's undergraduate grade point aver-
age (GPA) and Law School Admissions Test (LSAT) score. 
Admissions officials, however, also were directed to "look be-
yond grades and test scores" to other criteria that the Law 
School deemed important.57 These so-called "soft" variables in-
cluded "the enthusiasm of recommenders, the quality of the un-
dergraduate institution, the quality of the applicant's essay, and 
the areas and difficulty of undergraduate course selection."58 
To meet its goals of achieving "that diversity which has the po-
tential to enrich everyone's education and thus make a law school 
class stronger than the sum of its parts,"59 the policy did not restrict 
the type of diversity contributions that could be considered by the 
admissions officers. However, the admissions policy reaffirmed the 
Law School's commitment to "racial and ethnic diversity."60 In par-
ticular, the Law School sought to enroll a "critical mass" of under-
represented minority applicants, "who without the Law School's 
commitment might not be represented in [the] student body in 
meaningful numbers. "61 The underrepresented grougs included Af-
rican-Americans, Hispanics, and Native-Americans. 
In 1996, Barbara Grutter, a white Michigan resident with a 
3.8 GPA and 161 LSAT score, applied and was denied admission 
to the Law School.63 Grutter filed suit in federal district court, 
alleging that the Law School discriminated against her on the ba-
sis of race in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment by using 
race as a predominant factor in admissions. The U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Michigan found in favor of 
Grutter, concluding that the Law School's use of race was unlaw-
ful.64 The district court held that the Law School's interest in as-
sembling a racially diverse class was not a compelling state inter-
est and that the Law School had not "narrowly tailored its use of 
race to further that interest."65 The U.S. Court of Appeals for 
56. 539 U.S. at 315. 
57. !d. 
58. !d. 
59. !d. 
60. !d. at 316. 
61. !d. 
62. !d. 
63. !d. 
64. 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 20<Jl). 
65. !d. at 872. 
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the Sixth Circuit, sitting en bane, reversed in a contentious 5-4 
vote on both grounds, holding that diversity constituted a com-
pelling state interest under Bakke and that the Law School's pol-
icy was narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling interest be-
cause race was only used as a "potential 'plus' factor. "66 The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide "a question of na-
tional importance: Whether diversity is a compelling interest 
that can justify the narrowly-tailored use of race in selecting ap-
plicants for admission to public universities."67 
A. JUSTICES VOTING TO UPHOLD THE 
LAW SCHOOL'S ADMISSIONS POLICY 
1. Justice O'Connor68 
Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, holding that 
the Law School's admissions policy satisfied strict scrutiny by ad-
vancing a compelling state interest in using race as one of the fac-
tors to be considered in the admission process and by demonstrat-
ing that the use of race was narrowly tailored to achieve this 
compelling interest. She began by reviewing the Bakke decision, 
in which only Justice Powell believed that the attainment of a di-
verse student body could be a compelling interest. Substantial 
confusion existed in the lower courts on whether a rationale set 
forth in an opinion not joined by any other Justice constituted 
"binding precedent."69 Justice O'Connor did not need to resolve 
this question because the Court was ready to "endorse Justice 
Powell's view that student body diversity is a compelling state in-
terest which can justify the use of race in university admissions." 70 
Justice O'Connor then turned to the doctrinal test to be 
used in evaluating the Law School's admissions policy: racial 
classifications only may be used "for the most compelling rea-
son," and only if they are narrowly tailored to further those rea-
66. 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en bane). 
67. 539 u.s. 306,322 (2002). 
68. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined the majority opinion. 
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322. Justices Scalia and Thomas joined only with respect to two 
points: (1) that unequal treatment among underrepresented minority groups is unconsti-
tutional; and (2) that in 25 years, the practices upheld by the majority will be illegal. !d. at 
344-45 (Thomas & Scalia, 11., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
69. !d. at 321. In Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), the Court held that 
"[w]hcn a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result en-
joys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position 
taken by those Members who concurred in the judgment on the narrowest grounds." 
70. 539 U.S. at 325. 
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sons.
71 The use of "strict scrutiny" when the government em-
ploys racial classifications is necessary, according to Justice 
O'Connor, to '"smoke out' illegitimate uses of race."72 Justice 
O'Connor softened this stern description of strict scrutiny with 
two caveats. First, " [ s )trict scrutiny is not 'strict in theory, but fa-
tal in fact."' 73 Second, the context in which a racial classification 
is used matters in evaluating the governmental action. She 
pointed out that "not every decision influenced by race is equally 
objectionable and strict scrutiny is designed to provide a frame-
work for carefully examining the importance and the sincerity of 
the reasons advanced by the government decisionmaker for the 
use of race in that particular context."74 
Justice O'Connor defined the purported compelling interest 
advanced by the Law School and set the stage for application of 
the strict scrutiny analysis. The Law School advanced "only one 
justification for their [sic) use of race in the admission process: 
obtaining 'the educational benefits that flow from a diverse stu-
dent body."'75 Justice O'Connor again cast the case in a light fa-
vorable to the Law School by making two additional qualifica-
tions. First, none of the affirmative action cases decided by the 
Court in the 25 years since Bakke "either expressly or implicitly" 
foreclosed the Law School's argument.76 Second, given that 
"universities occupy a special niche in our constitutional tradi-
tion," and in keeping with the Court's practice in disputes in-
volving complex educational judgments, the Court would grant a 
wide berth to the Law School's decisions.77 
Justice O'Connor described the educational benefits that 
"diversity is designed to produce."78 After a brief reference to 
the trial court's findings that "the Law School's admissions pol-
icy promotes 'cross racial understanding,' helps to break down 
racial stereotypes, and 'enables [students] to better understand 
persons of different races,"'79 she relied exclusively on state-
ments from amicus briefs to support the conclusion that the Law 
School had a compelling interest in utilizing race in its admis-
stons decisions. Representing the educational community, the 
71. /d. at 326. 
72. /d. (quoting Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,493 (1989)). 
73. /d. 
74. /d. at 327. 
75. /d. at 328. 
76. /d. 
77. /d. at 330. 
78. /d. 
79. /d. at 330. 
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American Educational Research Association noted that "diver-
sity promotes leaning outcomes, and better preRares students for 
an increasingly diverse workforce and society."8° From the busi-
ness community, General Motors asserted that diversity is neces-
sary to develop the skills needed b~ workers to complete in an 
"increasingly global marketplace." 1 The U.S. military added 
that "a highly qualified, racially diverse officer corps ... is essen-
tial to the military's ability to fulfill its principle mission to pro-
vide national security. "82 If the military needs affirmative action 
to fulfill its mission, "it requires only a small step from this 
analysis to conclude that our country's most selective institutions 
must remain both diverse and selective."83 Finally, the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools wrote that diversity in law schools 
is essential to cultivating leaders who are seen by the citizenry as 
legitimate, because a large proportion of elected political offices 
in the country are occupied by individuals with law degrees.84 
Justice O'Connor then discussed the narrow tailoring prong 
of the strict scrutiny test. Again giving deference to the Law 
School's educational judgment, she found that the flexible use of 
race in admissions decisions satisfied this prong. 85 The Law 
School's admissions policy was "highly individualized," involving 
a "holistic review of each applicant's file" and giving "serious 
consideration" to the multiple ways in which an applicant's 
background might contribute to a diverse educational environ-
80. /d. 
81. /d. 
82. /d. at 331. 
83. /d. 
84. /d. at 332. Among the dozens of amicus briefs submitted in support of the Uni-
versity of Michigan were those from the American Association for Higher Education, 
American Civil Liberties Union, American Council on Education, American Educa-
tional Research Association, American Law Deans Association, American Sociological 
Association, Association of American Colleges and Universities, Association of Ameri-
can Law Schools, Association of American Medical Colleges, Clinical Legal Education 
Association, Coalition of Bar Associations of Color, Coalition for Economic Equality, 
Committee of Concerned Black Graduates of ABA Accredited Law Schools, Executive 
Leadership Council, Family Members of Murdered Civil Rights Activists, Graduate 
Management Admission Council, Hispanic National Bar Association, Law School Ad-
mission Council, The Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, Minority Busi-
ness Enterprise Legal Defense and Education Fund, National Center for Fair and Open 
testing, National Partnership for Women and Families, National Women's Law Center, 
Society of American Law Teachers, and Veterans of the Southern Civil Rights Move-
ment, as well as various law school deans, law schools, law student groups, state bar asso-
ciations, law school alumni associations, and associations of minority lawyers. 
85. "(A]n admissions program must be 'flexible enough to consider all pertinent 
clements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to 
place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according to 
the same weight."' /d. at 334 (quoting Bakke). 
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ment.86 Justice O'Connor dismissed the argument that the Law 
School's policy was not narrowly tailored because race-neutral 
means exist to achieve the educational benefits derived from a 
diverse student body.87 Justice O'Connor considered but ulti-
mately rejected a lottery system88 and Florida and Texas's "per-
centage" plans89 as unworkable in the graduate/professional 
school context. 
Justice O'Connor concluded that "race conscious admis-
sions policies must be limited in time."90 Because of the inherent 
risk that racial classifications will be used more broadly than 
needed to accomplish compelling goals, they should have "a 
logical end point. "91 Justice O'Connor established the "logical 
end point" at 25 years. Given that "the number of minority ap-
plicants with high grades and test scores has indeed increased" 
during the 25 years that have passed since Bakke, Justice 
O'Connor anticipated that "25 years from now, the use of racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest 
approved today."92 
2. Justice Ginsburg 
In a short concurrence joined by Justice Breyer, Justice 
Ginsburg focused primarily on Justice O'Connor's 25-year sun-
set. Justice Ginsburg agreed that a sunset is appropriate, citing as 
support international law documents addressing the elimination 
of racial discrimination.93 She challenged the notion, however, 
that enough progress has been made on racial issues in the 
United States in the 25 years since Bakke to be able to "firmly 
forecast, that over the next generation's span, progress toward 
86. /d. at 337. 
87. /d. at 339. 
88. Justice O'Connor argued that a lottery system would not allow the school to 
achieve other educational values, such as selectivity. /d. at 339-40. 
89. These "percentage plans" guarantee undergraduate admission at state universi-
ties to all students above a certain class rank in every high school in the state. /d. at 340. 
90. /d. at 342. 
91. !d. 
92. /d. at 343. 
93. /d. at 344 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg refers to the International 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Annex to G.A. 
Res. 2106, 20 U.N. GAOR Res. Supp. (No. 14) 47, U.N. Doc. N6014, Art. 2(2) (1965), 
and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 
Annex to G.A. Res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Res. Supp. (no. 46) 194, U.N. Doc. N34/46, 
Art. 4(1) (1979). 
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nondiscrimination and genuinely equal opportunity will make it 
safe to sunset affirmative action. "94 
B. JUSTICES VOTING TO REJECT THE 
LAW SCHOOL'S ADMISSIONS POLICY 
1. Justice Scalia95 
Justice Scalia concurred in only two aspects of the major-
ity's holding,96 and the remainder of his short opinion took the 
majority to task on several points. He noted that the majority 
failed to address the central arguments raised in dissent by Chief 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas. Justice Scalia then con-
centrated his fire on the likely effects of the majority's decision. 
Justice Scalia first addressed the relevance of the majority's 
ruling for future cases. He restated the educational benefit the 
Law School sought as including "cross-racial understanding," 
and a "better prepar[ ation ofJ students for an increasingly di-
verse workforce and society."9 But this benefit is not "uniquely 
relevant" to the Law School, or "uniquely 'teachable' in a formal 
educational setting."98 Accordingly, this interest cannot be lim-
ited to the University of Michigan Law School but instead ar-
guably is appropriate for other public institutions, such as Michi-
gan's civil service system, and for private employers who seek to 
"'teach' good citizenship to their adult employees through a pa-
triotic, all-American system of racial discrimination in hiring. "99 
Troubled by this possibility, Justice Scalia sneered that "[t)he 
nonminority individuals who are deprived of a legal education, a 
civil service job, or any job at all by reason of their skin color will 
surely understand." 100 
Justice Scalia then accused the majority of prolonging litiga-
tion in this area. He listed a number of issues in which further 
litigation is likely to be sparked by what he characterizes as the 
"Grutter-Gratz split double header. " 101 Such future litigation 
likely will arise in resolving whether there has been enough 
evaluation of a candidate as an individual, in determining 
94. 539 U.S. at 346 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
95. Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia's opinion. !d. at 344. 
96. See supra note 68. 
97. Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 347 (Scalia, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part). 
98. !d. 
99. !d. at 348. 
100. !d. 
101. !d. 
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whether a university has exceeded the bounds of a "good faith 
effort," and in assessing the educational benefits flowing from 
racial diversity. 102 
2. Justice Thomas103 
Justice Thomas also concurred with only two aspects of the 
majority's holding104 and rebuked the majority on several points. 
Justice Thomas's opinion developed two themes: doctrinal and 
personal. 
The doctrinal discussion focused on strict scrutiny jurispru-
dence and its application to this case. In the past, the Court re-
jected as a compelling state interest the use of racial classifications 
to provide minority teachers as role models, 105 to remedy general 
societal discrimination, 106 and to further the best interests of chil-
dren in custody disputes. 107 According to Justice Thomas, these 
prior cases mandated a very limited definition of a compelling 
state interest: "only those measures the State must take to provide 
a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence." 108 Justice 
Thomas argued that the interest the Law School sought to ad-
vance- "to obtain 'educational benefits that flow from student 
body diversity,"' 109 -is no more than an interest in improving 
"marginally the education it offers without sacrificing too much of 
its exclusivity and elite status."110 Unlike the other dissenting 
opinions, which focused primarily on a few aspects of the major-
ity's opinion, Justice Thomas launched a frontal assault on the 
majority opinion's development of the compelling interest and the 
narrow tailoring prongs of the strict scrutiny test. 
As to the compelling interest prong, Justice Thomas argued 
that the state has no "pressing public necessity" in maintaining a 
public law school or in the marginal improvements in legal educa-
tion that arguably derive from using racial classifications in the 
admissions process. 111 In support of this conclusion, he argued that 
the Law School's purported compelling interest does little "to ad-
102. !d. 
103. Justice Scalia joined Justice Thomas's opinion. !d. at 349. 
I 04. See mpra note 68. 
105. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed .. 476 U.S. 267,275-76 (1986). 
106. Richmond v. Croson, 488 U.S. 469,496-98 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
107. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429,433 (1984). 
108. Gruuer, 539 U.S. at 353. 
109. !d. at 354. 
II 0. !d. at 355-56. 
Ill. /d. at 356-57. 
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vance the welfare of the people of Michigan or any cognizable in-
terest of the State of Michigan." 112 Because the Law School 
"trains few Michigan residents and overwhelmingly serves stu-
dents, who, as lawyers, leave the State of Michigan," the Law 
School failed to identify any sufficiently compelling interest. 113 As 
to the narrow tailoring prong, Justice Thomas criticized the major-
ity for selectively relying on social science evidence and for defer-
ring to the Law School's use of racial classifications to solve a 
problem that the Law School itself created. 
The second, more personal theme of Justice Thomas's opin-
ion is reflected in a quotation from an 1865 speech by Frederick 
Douglass, which argued that African-Americans and other non-
whites do not need the government's help. "Like Douglass, I be-
lieve blacks can achieve in every avenue of American life with-
out the meddling of university administrators. "114 Justice Tho-
mas asserted that the majority failed to advance any evidence 
showing that the Law School's policy benefits students admitted 
as a result of it. There is no evidence these students "prove 
themselves by performing at (or even near) the same level as 
those students who receive no preferences."115 The majority also 
offered no social science research disproving the notion that af-
firmative action "engender[ s] attitudes of superiority or, alterna-
tively, provoke[s] resentment among those who believe that they 
have been wronged by the government's use of race." 116 Ulti-
mately, he argued, the race-conscious policy stigmatizes as unde-
serving all minority students admitted to the Law School. 117 
3. Chief Justice Rehnquist 118 
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for "an un-
precedented display of deference under our strict scrutiny analy-
sis."119 In particular, the Chie~ Justice focused on the "critical 
mass" concept: "stripped of its 'critical mass' veil, the Law 
School's pro~ram is revealed as a naked effort to achieve racial 
balancing." 12 
112. /d. at 360. 
113. /d. 
114. /d. at350. 
115. /d. at 371. 
116. /d. at 373. 
117. /d. 
118. Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined Chief Justice Rchnquist's dissent-
ing opinion. /d. at 378. 
119. /d. at 387 (Rehnquist, C.J.. dissenting). 
120. /d. at 379. 
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Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the majority's applica-
tion of the strict scrutiny test was contrary to the Court's prece-
dents. The majority applied a more lenient review than that re-
quired under strict scrutiny. Neither the fact that the Law School 
uses racial classifications in "good faith" nor the fact that the de-
fendant is an institution of higher education justified the major-
ity's lax approach. 121 
In disputing the "critical mass" concept, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist noted that the Law School failed to explain why the 
numbers of individuals who constitute a "critical mass" vary 
from minority group to minority group. According to Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, "the Law School's admissions practices with re-
spect to [underrepresented minority groups] differ dramatically 
and cannot be defended under any consistent use of the term 
'critical mass."' 122 He pointed out that the number of students 
who constitute a critical mass was larger for African-Americans 
than for other underrepresented minorities. For example, from 
1995-2000, the Law School admitted 13-19 Native-Americans, 
91-108 African-Americans, and 47-56 Hispanics. 123 
The Chief Justice also challenged the majority's assertion 
that the Law School did not try to ensure admission to "some 
specified percentage" of a minority group because of its race. He 
argued that "the correlation between the percentage of the Law 
School's pool of applicants who are members of the three minor-
ity groups and the percentage of the admitted applicants who are 
members of these same groups is far too precise to be dismissed 
as merely the result of the school paying 'some attention to 
numbers."' 124 Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that the Law 
School offered admission to members of underrepresented mi-
nority groups in proportion to their statistical representation in 
the applicant pool, a "patently un.constitutional" practice. 125 
4. Justice Kennedy 
Like the Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy also faulted the ma-
jority for failing to apply the strict scrutiny test as developed in 
prior cases. Although Justice Kennedy agreed in principle with 
Justice Powell's view in Bakke that racial diversity among stu-
121. /d. at 379-80. 
122. /d.at381. 
123. /d. 
124. /d. at 383. 
125. /d. 
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dents could be a compelling interest, the Law School failed to 
make that showing in this case. 126 
Justice Kennedy argued that the critical mass concept is in-
consistent with the principle that applicants must be given indi-
vidual consideration in the admissions process. Eighty to eighty-
five percent of the spaces in the entering class are given to appli-
cants in the upper range of the quantitative criteria (GPA and 
LSAT scores). "[T]he competition becomes tight" in the remain-
ing 15 to 20 percent, where "race is likely outcome determinative 
for many members of minority groups." 127 Justice Kennedy ar-
gued that individual consideration of an applicant's file, which 
according to the majority is critical in finding that the program is 
constitutional, did not take place within the Law School's pro-
gram. Like the Chief Justice, Justice Kennedy found troubling 
the "narrow fluctuation band" in the percentage of enrolled mi-
nority students at the Law School. 128 Justice Kennedy was par-
ticularly disturbed by the fact that admissions officers at the Law 
School consulted the daily reports indicating the racial composi-
tion of the incoming class. 129 
Justice Kennedy concluded by lamenting the most serious 
consequence of the Court's ruling: relieving university adminis-
trators from their obligation to devise "new and fairer ways to 
ensure individual consideration"130 and reducing the incentives 
that now exist "to make the existing minority admissions 
schemes transparent and protective of individual review." 131 
This, in turn, would "perpetuate the hostilities that proper con-
sideration of race is designed to avoid." 132 
III. AFFIRMATIVE REFRACTION: THE CASE 
FOR A JURISPRUDENCE OF HUMILITY 
At one level, of course, these two cases could not be more 
different. In The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, the court be-
low imposed murder convictions and death sentences on four 
explorers who killed and ate a colleague in order to survive after 
they were trapped by a landslide in a cave. In Grutter, the Sixth 
126. /d. at 392 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
127. /d. at 389. 
128. /d. at 390. 
129. !d. at 391. 
130. /d. at 393. 
131. /d. at 394. 
132. /d. 
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Circuit rejected a constitutional challenge by a white applicant 
denied admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Yet 
in deciding these cases, the judicial composition of the highest 
courts in the respective lands is surprisingly similar. 
Both courts are divided into "liberal," "conservative" and 
"swing" camps. Justices Foster and Handy comprised the liberal 
camp of the Newgarth Supreme Court, with Justices Breyer, 
Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens playing the same role in the 
United States Supreme Court. At the opposite end, the conser-
vative bloc of the Newgarth Supreme Court included Chief Jus-
tice Truepenny and Justice Keen, while Chief Justice Rehnquist 
and Justices Scalia and Thomas represent the conservative fac-
tion in the Supreme Court. Finally, Justice Tatting and Justices 
Kennedy and O'Connor represented the swing votes in the 
Newgarth Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court, 
respectively. We recognize, of course, that these are rough, im-
perfect groupings, and that the manner in which we interpret 
these terms in 2004 likely is very different from their interpreta-
tion in 1949 when Lon Fuller wrote The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers. 133 
Moreover, both courts grapple with several common juris-
prudential themes. Indeed, strands of all five opinions in The 
Case of the Spe/uncean Explorers can be found in the majority 
and dissenting opinions in Grutter. 
In bridging the span between these two cases, we employ 
what we call a "jurisprudence of humility." We argue that this 
approach is neither liberal nor conservative, but rather evinces 
133. The division of the current Supreme Court into these three camps nevertheless 
has much support in the literature. For a few of the many explicit references to Justices 
Kennedy and O'Connor as the Court's "swing" Justices, sec Neal Devins, Congress and the 
Making of the Second Rehnquist Court, 47 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 773,782 n.39 (2003); Harold 
Hongju Koh, On American Exceptiona/ism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479, 1514 (2003); Richard G. 
Wilkins & Scott Worthington et al., Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 2000 Term, 29 
HASTI~GS CONST. L.Q. 247,303 (2002); cf Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second 
Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L.J. 569, 587 (2003) (noting 
that the Court "is divided into two camps, in which two Justices (O'Connor and Kennedy) 
arc somc:what more weakly attached to the majority than arc the other three members"); 
Erwin Chcmerinsky, October Term 2002, 6 GREEN BAG 2D 367, 368 (2003) ("[L]awyers 
who handle cases before the Court long have felt that they must focus primarily on an audi-
ence of one or two, with the outcome likely depending on the votes of Justices Sandra Day 
O'Connor and/or Anthony Kennedy"); Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous 
Justice: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Mathematics, 70S. CAL. L. REV. 63 (1996) (naming 
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor as the "most dangerous" Justices of the 1994 and 1995 
Terms); Paul H. Edelman & Jim Chen, The Most Dangerous Justice Rides Again: Revisiting 
the Power Pageam of the Justices, 86 MINN. L. REV. 131 (2001) (naming Justice Kennedy as 
the "most dangerous" Justice of 1994-2000 terms). 
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an appreciation that judges and lawyers hold no monopoly on 
wisdom and that institutions other than courts may be better po-
sitioned in certain situations to resolve a particular issue. A ju-
risprudence of humility neither freezes the status quo nor casu-
ally substitutes judges' views for those of other institutional 
players, but instead encourages, in Franklin D. Roosevelt's 
words, "bold, persistent experimentation." 134 Indeed, humility in 
judging has long been regarded a desired attribute 135 across the 
political spectrum.136 Such humility manifests itself in several 
ways, including a recognition that not all dumb statutes are un-
constitutional or need to be rewritten by judicial fiat. Indeed, 
one marker of a humble judge is that she not infrequently im-
plements laws she neither would have passed (as a member of 
the legislative branch) nor would have enforced (as a member of 
the executive branch) in the first instance. 
Three scholars recently have made eloquent pleas for a 
greater recognition of the importance of humility in judging. Mi-
chael McConnell states it well in a 1997 article: 13 
[A]n essential element of responsible judging is a respect for 
the opinions and judgments of others, and a willingness to sus-
pend belief, at least provisionally, in the correctness of one's 
own opinions, especially when they conflict with the decisions 
134. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at Oglethorpe University (May 23, 1 932), in THE 
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF fRA:-IKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 639, 646 (Samuel D. 
Rosenman ed., 1938). 
135. See, e.g., Learned Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, in THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY: 
PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189, 190 (Irving Dilliard ed., 3d ed. 1960) 
(describing the "spirit of liberty" as "the spirit which is not too sure that it is right"); Felix 
Frankfurter, Chief Justices I Have Known, 39 VA. L. REV. 883, 905 (1953) ("What is es-
sential in [Supreme Court Justices is] ... first and foremost, humility and an understand-
ing of the range of the problems and of their own inadequacy in dealing with them .... "). 
136. See, e.g., Paul Gewirtz, On "I Know It When I See It," 105 YALE L.J. 1023, 1034-
35 (1996) ("But one clement that helps to accommodate judicial review and democratic 
values is a feeling and attitude-a judge's feeling of humility, an internalized sense that 
he is not the sole repository of constitutional truth, an attitude of restraint that is an as-
pect of temperament."); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1365, 1372 (1997) ("[Tjranslators struggle with a tension that defines the tension con-
fronted by the judge: If translation requires creativity-if there is no such thing as 'me-
chanical' translation-then some counsel the translator to a kind of humility. Humility 
means this: to avoid translations that the translator believes make the text a better text· 
to choose instead translations that will carry over a text's llaws as well as its virtues."): 
Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1749 
(1995) ("[Ijncompletely theorized agreements have the advantage, for ordinary lawyers 
and judges, of humility and modesty: they allow past judgments to be treated as given 
and make it unnecessary to create the law anew in each case."). 
137. Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humili1y in Judicial Review: A 
Comment on Ronald Dworkin's "Moral Reading" of 1he Constitwion, 65 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 1269 (1997). 
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of others who have, no less than judges, sworn an oath to up-
hold and defend the Constitution. We have heard a lot about 
"principle" and "the correct standard" and "integrity." I think 
we need to hear more about judicial humility. 138 
Judge McConnell concludes that the various constraints on judi-
cial discretion can be understood as means of "tempering judi-
cial arrogance by forcing judges to confront, and take into ac-
count, the opinions of others-whether they be the Framers of 
the Constitution (text and original understanding), the represen-
tatives of the people (the presumption of constitutionality), the 
decentralized contributors to longstanding practice (tradition), 
or judges in earlier cases (precedent)." 139 Judge McConnell notes 
that hard cases occur where these sources are in conflict. In con-
trast, "where all of these sources of wisdom are united-where 
the decision of the representatives of the people is not manifestly 
inconsistent with constitutional text, original understanding, 
longstanding practice, or governing precedent-it is time for 
judges to recognize their own fallibility." 140 
The following year, Brett Scharffs141 accepted Judge McCon-
nell's invitation "to hear more about judicial humility." 142 Profes-
sor Scharffs argues that "practical wisdom" is the best model 
through which to understand judicial decisionmaking143 and that 
judges, like Anthony Kronman, 144 should embody certain virtues 
138. !d. at 1292. 
139. !d. Interestingly, Judge McConnell is sharply critical of RONALD DWORKIN, 
THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996), yet Professor 
Dworkin closed an earlier work by arguing that his ideal judge with infinite time, re-
sources, and intellect-Judge Hercules-nevertheless should "decide hard cases with 
humility." Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1109 (1975). 
140. McConnell, supra note 137, atl293. 
141. Brcll Scharffs, The Role of Humility in Exercising Practical Wisdom, 32 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 127 (1998). 
142. McConnell, supra note 137, atl292. 
143. Scharffs, supra note 141, at 145-47. For discussions of practical wisdom and 
practical reasoning, sec generally Robert John Araujo, Method in Interpretation: Practi-
cal Wisdom and the Search for Meaning in Public Legal Texts, 68 MISS. L.J. 225 (1998); 
William N. Eskridge, Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reason-
ing, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: 
Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992); PhilipP. Frickey, 
Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian 
Law, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1137 (1990); Michael Livingston, Practical Reason, "Purposism," 
and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 51 TAX L. REV. 677 (1996); Lynda Ross Meyer, Is 
Practical Reason Mindless?, 86 GEO. L.J. 647 (1998); Martha C. Nussbaum, Skepticism 
About Practical Reason in Literature and the Law, 107 HARV. L. REV. 714 (1994); David 
E. Van Zandt, An Alternative Theory of Practical Reason in Judicial Decisions, 65 TUL. 
L. REV. 775 (1991). 
144. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEAS OF THE 
LEGAL PROFESSION 319-20 (1993). 
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of character in exercising practical wisdom. According to Profes-
sor Scharffs, Dean Kronman's focus on the virtues of sympathy 
and detachment ignores the role that humility can play in mediat-
ing conflicts between these virtues, much as humility can bridge 
the gap between mercy and justice in individual cases. 145 Appro-
priate judicial humility thus "lies in a mean between undesirable 
extremes"146 -neither underdone (resulting in "pride, arrogance, 
or vanity" 147) nor overdone (resulting in "worthlessness, subjuga-
tion, or servility"148). Professor Scharffs notes that "[a] judge is 
more likely to err on the side of having too little humility than too 
much." 149 Finally, Professor Scharffs contends that proper humil-
ity also will have other salutary effects on the judicial process. 
Humble judges respect the sources of authority that constrain and 
guide their behavior. They resist revolutionary change and judicial 
activism, do not abuse their gower or parties that appear before 
them, and have open minds. 1 
Most recently, Suzanna Sherry151 has extolled the virtue of 
humility in judging. Professor Sherry observes at the outset that 
"[t]he proposition that judges should be humble rather than arro-
gant hardly needs stating." 152 Professor Sherry acknowledges the 
difficulty of mediating the duality between humility and courage, 
like the difficulty of mediating other dualities in the law. 153 In the 
end, Professor Sherry eschews rules and guidelines in favor of ex-
amples from the Supreme Court of excessive humility at one ex-
treme154 and insufficient humility at the other extreme, 155 as well 
145. Scharffs, supra note 141, at 145-47. 
146. /d. atl59. 
147. /d. 
148. /d. 
149. /d. at 164; see also Thomas A. Wiseman, Jr., What Doth the Lord Require of 
Thee?, 27 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1403 (1996) ("Most lawyers I know would say that a hum-
ble federal judge is an oxymoron; and they arc probably right.") 
150. Scharffs, supra note 141, at 186-98. 
151. Suzanna Sherry, Judges of Character, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 793 (2003). 
152. /d. at 799. 
153. Other dualities include the countermajoritarian dilemma of majority rule versus 
minority rights, liberty versus equality, establishment versus free exercise of religion, and 
governmental power versus accountability. /d. at 795. 
154. /d. at 805-09 (citing as examples Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (declining 
to reach merits of constitutional challenge to Connecticut statutory ban on sale or use of 
contraceptives, which was declared unconstitutional four years later in Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)); Koramatsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (approv-
ing constitutionality of internment of Japanese-Americans during World War II); and 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (approving constitutionality of curfews 
imposed on Japanese-Americans during World War II)). For a discussion of the dangers 
of excessive judicial humility spawning passivity, see Daniel J. Meltzer, The Supreme 
Court's Judicial Passivity, 2!XJ2 SUP. CT. REV. 343. 
155. /d. at 800-03 (citing as examples Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (holding un-
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as instances in which she thinks the Court struck the proper bal-
ance.156 Of course, one can (and we do) take issue with the place-
ment of certain decisions along the humility-courage continuum, 
but we agree with Professor Sherry that "judges who are inclined 
both to doubt themselves and to risk being wrong are more likely 
to reach a happy medium than are judges who are too strongly in-
clined toward arrogance or humility."157 The jurisprudence of 
humility equips us to draw some rather surprising connections be-
tween The Case of the Speluncean Explorers158 and Grutter159 and 
to span the gulf in the legal literature between statutory and con-
stitutional interpretation. 
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION IN GRUTTER 
The surprise is nowhere starker than in an analysis of Jus-
tice O'Connor's majority opinion, joined by the four members of 
the Court's liberal bloc. Just as Chief Justice Truepenny and Jus-
tice Keen in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers felt con-
strained by their institutional role to defer to the Legislature's 
overly broad statute in affirming the defendants' murder convic-
tions, Justice O'Connor deferred to Michigan's thin diversity ra-
tionale in sanctioning the use of race in admissions. In so doing, 
Justice O'Connor enshrined Justice Powell's Bakke opinion as 
the Court's majority position, despite considerable evidence that 
constitutional Florida's recount procedures in 2000 Presidential election); Dred Scott v. 
Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857) (upholding constitutionality of separate but equal 
racial classifications)). 
156. /d. at 804-11 (citing as examples Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2()(XJ) 
(refusing to overrule Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding unconstitutional 
admission of confession obtained without apprising criminal defendant of various consti-
tutional rights)); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992) (refusing to overrule Roc v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding unconstitu-
tional various state restrictions on abortion)); Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Tran-
sit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling Nat'! League of Cities v. Usery (1976) 
(holding unconstitutional federal regulation of wages and hours of employees of state 
and local governments)); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (rejecting constitu-
tional challenge to release of tape recordings of Presidential conversations); Brown v. 
Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding unconstitutional separate but equal educa-
tional facilities); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (over-
ruling Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Goblitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding constitutionality 
of requiring students to salute American nag)); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 
Wheat.) 316 (1819) (upholding constitutionality of national bank)). 
157. !d. at 810. 
158. For more detailed commentary on The Case of the Speluncean Explorers, sec 
supra note 7. 
159. For some of the early commentary on Cruller, sec A JURIST On-Line Sympo-
sium: The University of Michigan Affirmative Action Cases, http://www.jurist.pitt.edu/ 
forum/symposium-aa. 
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the other eight Justices in Bakke rejected Justice Powell's ap-
proach.160 In finding that the educational benefits from a diverse 
student body constituted a compelling state interest, Justice 
O'Connor twisted precedent and unabashedly accepted Michi-
gan's justification for the policy without requiring much support-
ing social science evidence. In other cases involving racial classi-
fications, the Court has not been so quick to accept justifications 
proffered by state officials and has required much more eviden-
tiary support for the classification. 161 Moreover, Justice 
O'Connor turned strict scrutiny doctrine on its head by holding 
that the enormous flexibility of Michigan's policy is what makes 
it narrowly tailored. In examining the Sixth Circuit's similar 
holding, Peter Schuck correctly noted that the appeals court 
jumped "off the rails" in its "brief analysis of the 'narrowly tai-
loring' that strict scrutiny demands." 162 Professor Schuck's char-
acterization of the Sixth Circuit's holding applies with equal 
force to Justice O'Connor's majority opinion: "Reduced to its 
essentials, the majority's position is that diversity means what 
Michigan says it means and that any sincere effort by Michi~an 
to achieve the critical mass satisfies the narrow tailoring test." 63 
Justice O'Connor's decision to sacrifice doctrine to achieve 
her desired outcome in Grutter164 stands in marked contrast to 
her role in Lawrence v. Texas, 165 decided three days later. In 
Lawrence, Justice O'Connor pointedly did not join the majority 
opinion, written by Justice Kennedy (the Court's other swing 
160. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Public Deliberation, Affirmative Action, and the Su-
preme Court, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1179, 1185 (1996) ("Of course, the often-criticized 'rule' of 
[Bakke] was that universities may usc race ·as a factor' in admissions, but may not create 
quotas. While this rule has played a crucial role in American society and American de-
bate, it represented the view of Justice Powell alone. The other eight participating jus-
tices explicitly rejected that rule. Ironically, the case stands for a proposition that only 
one justice thought sensible."). 
161. The most famous illustration, of course, is Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 
483 (1954). In Brown, the Court relied in a footnote on various social science studies of 
the adverse effect of segregated schools on African-American children. /d. at 494 n.ll. 
For different perspectives on the Court's usc of social science evidence in Brown, sec 
Kenneth C. Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientists' Role, 5 
VJLL. L. REV. 224 (1959); Harold B. Gerard, School Desegregation: The Social Science 
Role, 38 AM. PSYCHOL. 869 (1983); James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Sci-
ence Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659 (2003); James E. 
Ryan, Schools, Race, and Money, 109 YALE L.J. 249 (1999); Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown 
Foolflote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court's Quest for 
Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 793 (2002). 
162. Peter H. Schuck, Diversity, AM. LAW., July 31,2002, at 75. 
163. /d at 76. 
164. Cf Nat Hcntoff, What the Supreme Court Left Ow, VILLAGE VOICE, July 22, 2003, 
at34 ("Justice Sandra Day O'Connor knew how she wanted [Gntller] to be decided.''). 
165. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). 
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Justice) and joined again by the Court's four liberal Justices. The 
majority overruled Bowers v. Hardwick 166 and held that a Texas 
statute criminalizing sodomy violated the due process rights of 
two men engaged in a consensual act of sodomy at home. Justice 
O'Connor concurred separately and argued that the statute vio-
lated the defendants' equal protection rights because it pro-
scribed homosexual sodomy but not heterosexual sodomr,. Her 
reasoning thereby obviated the need to overrule Bowers. 67 Al-
though Justice O'Connor displayed greater fealty to judicial 
precedent than the majority, still she refused to give the same 
deference to the Texas legislature in Lawrence that she gave to 
the University of Michigan in Grutter. Justice Handy's deploy-
ment of polling data in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers to 
conform the judicial outcome to popular will provides a helpful 
window through which to view Justice O'Connor's actions. 
In both cases, Justice O'Connor championed the more po-
litically popular result,168 supported in Lawrence by the reduc-
tion in the number of states criminalizing sodomy (from twenty-
five states at the time of Bowers to thirteen states today) and in 
Grutter by the vast number of amicus briefs from the likes of the 
U.S. military and General Motors in support of the diversity ra-
tionale.169 But Justice O'Connor missed the chance to accom-
plish in Grutter what she accomplished in Lawrence: obtaining 
the outcome she sought without undermining the Court's legiti-
macy through dishonest manipulation of well-settled doctrine. 
A more "humble" course of action for Justice O'Connor in 
Grutter would have been to follow the trail blazed by Justice 
Tatting in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers. Conflicted by 
166. 47S U.S. 186 (1986). 
167. 123 S. Ct. at2884-88 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
168. For charges that Justice O'Connor often falls victim to the "Greenhouse Ef-
fect," se<.: Michael C. Dorf, Fourth Annual Supreme Court Review: October 2002 Term, 
PLI LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES NO. 
HO-OOJA (2002) ("Conservative jurists appointed by Republican Presidents come to 
Washington and, the pundits charge, in an effort to impress such liberal establishment 
figures as New York Times reporter Linda Greenhouse, lose the courage of their convic-
tions. The charge seems particularly apt in the case of O'Connor and Kennedy."). Tho-
mas Sowell is credited with originating the phrase, which then was popularized by Judge 
Laurence Silberman. See Laurence Silberman, Allacking Activism, Judge Names Names, 
LEGAL TIMES, June 22, 1992, at 14; see also Max Boot, How Judges Can Make Friends in 
Washington, WALL ST.J., July 13,1998, at A15; Martin Tolchin, Press Is Condemned By 
a Federal Judge for Court Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1992, at Al3. 
169. See Auorneys a1 Law, CNN, June 23, 2003 ("The biggest influence on Justice 
O'Connor in that opinion, you could tell, were the briefs from General Motors, from 3M, 
from Microsoft, from retired military officers, the establishment saying we embrace affirma-
tive action. That's why she decided the way she did.") (statement of Jeffrey Toobin). 
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the arguments on both sides of the bench, Justice Tatting with-
drew from the case and, with the Supreme Court of Newgarth 
deadlocked at 2-2, the result was to affirm the convictions and 
death sentences imposed by the trial court. As a consequence, 
the pressure shifted to the other branches of government to pro-
vide justice in both the current (through the Chief Executive's 
exercise of its power to grant clemency to the defendants) and 
future (through the Legislature's exercise of its power to amend 
the murder statute) cases. 
One would have expected Justice O'Connor to have been 
similarly conflicted in Grutter. Yet her majority opinion reflects 
no hesitancy on her part in casting the deciding vote in favor of 
Michigan's policy. Had Justice O'Connor instead followed Jus-
tice Tatting's approach, the Supreme Court would have dead-
locked at 4-4 and thus affirmed the decision below by the Sixth 
Circuit. 170 This approach is more consistent with a true jurispru-
dence of humility because it achieves the result Justice 
O'Connor sought in Grutter-permitting the use of race in law 
school admissions-without contorting the constitution. Such a 
split decision would have left the parties, education officials, 
federal and state governments, and other political branches to 
continue to work toward a colorblind society in which racial 
preferences will no longer be necessary. 
Indeed, as Cass Sunstein noted in the context of an earlier 
affirmative action case,171 "because the issue of affirmative ac-
tion is not clearly settled by constitutional history or principle 
and is at the center of current political deliberations, the Court 
does well to avoid an authoritative judicial ruling. "172 Justice 
O'Connor's majority opinion in Grutter is the "democratic disas-
ter" feared by Professor Sunstein because it "foreclose[ s] de-
170. 288 F.3d 732 (6th Cir. 2002) (en bane). For a recent article applauding the 
Court's long-standing practice of affirming the lower court's judgment in cases where the 
Court is evenly divided, sec Edward A. Hartnell, Ties in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 643 (2002). Of course, a judge's failure to cast a deciding 
vote can he criticized as an abdication of her judicial responsibility, like "the example of 
Pontius Pilate, whose washing of hands has, for two thousand years, held central place as 
the condemnable paradigm of terminal leave of judgment." Milner S. Ball, THE WORD 
AND THE LAW 138 (1993). Professor Ball's reference is to MATTHEW 27:24 ("When Pi-
late saw that the was getting nowhere, but that instead an uproar was starting, he took 
water and washed his hands in front of the crowd. 'I am innocent of this man's blood' he 
said. 'It is your responsibility!"'); see also Jim Chen, Filburn's Legacy, 52 EMORY 'L.J. 
1719,1768 n.376 (2003) (comparing Pilate's actions with Justice Tatting's "abdication" in 
The Case of the Speluncean Explorers). 
171. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996) cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996). 
172. Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things 
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) (footnote omitted). 
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mocratic debate" by enshrining Michigan's nebulous use of di-
versity.173 In contrast, Justice Tatting's approach would have 
been more consistent with Professor Sunstein's ideal: 
When a democracy is in moral flux, courts may not be the best 
or the final answers. Judicial answers may be wrong. They may 
be counterproductive even if they are right. Courts do best by 
proceeding in a way that is catalytic rather than preclusive, and 
that is closely attuned to the fact that courts are participants in 
a system of democratic deliberation. It is both inevitable and 
proper that the lasting solutions to the great questions of politi-
cal morality will come from democratic politics, not the judici-
ary. But the Court can certainly increase the likelihood that 
those solutions will be good ones. Sometimes the best way for 
the Court to do this is by leaving things undecided. 174 
One difficulty in reinstating the Sixth Circuit's en bane deci-
sion to dispose of the case is the serious charge leveled by two of 
the dissenting judges that Chief Judge Martin manipulated the 
Sixth Circuit's internal processes to obtain the 5-4 decision in fa-
vor of the University of Michigan. The dissent alleges that Chief 
Judge Martin withheld the en bane petition from the other 
members of the court for five months until two conservative 
judges took senior status and thus were no longer eligible to vote 
on the petition or sit on the en bane panel. The dissent also al-
leged that Chief Justice Martin inserted himself on the original 
panel despite an internal rule requiring the random assignment 
of judges to panels. 175 
Chief Judge Martin's actions triggered judicial and congres-
sional investigations. In January 2003, Judicial Watch, a public 
interest group that monitors government corruption, filed a 
complaint of judicial misconduct in the Grutter case (as well as in 
a death penalty case)176 against Chief Judge Martin. Although 
the Acting Chief Judge to whom the complaint was referred 
found that the two allegations were not disputed, she dismissed 
the complaint. Because the Sixth Circuit was in the process of 
performing a comprehensive review of its internal procedures, it 
reportedly was "taking corrective action regarding all of the is-
sues raised by the complainant." Moreover, the Chief Judge's 
term soon would be ending pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
173. /d. at 93. 
174. /d. at 101. 
175. /d. at 773 (Boggs, J., dissenting); id. at 815 (Batchelder, J., dissenting). 
176. In re Byrd, 269 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2002) 
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§ 45(a)(3)(A). 177 Judicial Watch and Chief Judge Martin sepa-
rately appealed to the Judicial Council of the Sixth Circuit, 
which made "no findings of fact concerning the allegations of the 
complaint and expresse[ d] no opinion with respect to its con-
tent" but concurred in the Acting Chief Judge's finding and 
adopted her reasoning. 178 
The increased attention that Justice O'Connor's withdrawal 
would have brought to the Sixth Circuit's decision would have in-
creased the public's respect for the courts. Fidelity to doctrine and 
rigorous self-regulation are hallmarks of a strong, independent ju-
diciary. In an extraordinary debate in the Sixth Circuit, the judges 
all agreed that the court's legitimacy depends on the perception 
that judges engage in principled decisionmaking but disagreed on 
whether the public airing of the procedural irregularities in Grut-
ter enhanced or harmed that legitimacy. Judge Moore took issue 
with the dissent's "baseless argument" that "the decisions of this 
court are not grounded in principle and reasoned argument, but in 
power, and that the judges of this court manipulate and ignore the 
rules in order to advance political agendas." 179 We think Judge 
Batchelder holds the better view, especially since the subsequent 
Sixth Circuit proceedings have borne out the substance of the dis-
sent's complaints of procedural irregularities: 
In her separate concurrence, Judge Moore expresses her be-
lief that by revealing (the procedural] history, Judge Baggs-
and I, by concurring- undermine the legitimacy of the court 
and do harm to ourselves, this court and the nation. I believe 
that exactly the opposite is true. Public confidence in this 
court or any other is premised on the certainty that the court 
follows the rules in every case, regardless of the question that 
a particular case presents. Unless we expose to public view 
177. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct No. 03-6-372-07 (6th Cir. May 28, 2003). 
178. In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct No. 03-6-372-07 (6th Cir. Judicial Coun-
cil, July 31, 2003); see also Michael!. Krauss, Loading the Dice for the Ruling?, WASH. 
TIMES, June 17, 2003, at Al7; Charles Lane, Court Dispute in Affirmative Action Case 
Ruled Moot, WASH. POST, Aug. 1, 2!Xl3, at A2. The House Judiciary Committee also is 
investigating Chief Judge Martin's conduct in the Grutter case. See A Judiciary Dimin-
ished Is Justice Denied: The Constitution, the Senate, and the Vacancy Crisis in the Federal 
Judiciary, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (2002) (statement of Steve Chabot, Chair, Subcomm. 
on the Constitution); id. at 41-42 (statement of Kay R. Daly, Coalition for a Fair Judici-
ary); see also Neil A. Lewis, House Panel to Study Ruling on Law School Admissions, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 2002, at AlO; Adam Liptak, Order Lacking on a Court: U.S. Appel-
late Judges in Cincinnati Spar in Public, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12,2003, at AlO. 
179. 288 F. 3d at 753 (Moore, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
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our failures to follow the court's established procedures, our 
claim to legitimacy is illegitimate. 180 
Justice O'Connor concluded her opinion with the predic-
tion-not drawn from any evidence or arguments in the case-
that the need for affirmative action in higher education will end 
within twenty-five years. 181 In the meantime, it may well be that 
the special problem of race in twenty-first century American law 
demands extraordinary redress from our legal institutions. Such 
redress is better for the country and for the judiciary when it can 
be achieved in ways that do not undermine the Court's legiti-
macy and that foster continued experimentation by the very offi-
cials and groups to which Justice O'Connor herself gives such a 
wide berth in Grutter. 182 
B. THE DISSENTING OPINIONS IN GRUTTER 
When viewed through the lens of The Case of the Spe-
luncean Explorers, the four dissenting opinions in Grutter, writ-
ten by the Court's three conservative Justices as well as by Jus-
tice Kennedy, reveal a number of fascinating jurisprudential 
themes. Some of those themes are not surprising, such as the 
strong "textualist" approach to constitutional interpretation 
found in all four of the dissenting opinions, Justice Scalia's char-
acteristic use of heightened rhetoric, and Justice Thomas's per-
sonal monologue about race. Still other themes catch us by sur-
prise, such as Justice Kennedy's embrace of a "humble" 
approach to constitutional interpretation. All of these themes 
find their parallels in the mythical Supreme Court of Newgarth. 
Perhaps the least surprising point of comparison between 
the dissenting opinions in Grutter and the two opinions voting 
to affirm the convictions in The Case of the Speluncean Explor-
ers is the stated preference for a nonactivist judiciary. This 
preference is observed in the real-life conservative Justices' 
strong "textualist" and "orifinalist" approach to the reading of 
constitutions and statutes,18 their advocacy for a stricter adher-
180. /d. at 815 (Batchelder, J ., dissenting). 
181. Justice Ginsburg's separate concurring opinion agreed in theory with the usc of 
a judicial sunset on racial preferences but refused to adopt a specific timetable. 539 U.S. 
345-46 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). 
182. For further views on Justice O'Connor's jurisprudence, see Symposium, Justice 
O'Connor: Twenty Years of Shaping Constitutional Law, 32 MCGEORGE L. REV. 821 
(2001); Judith Olans Brown ct al., The Rugged Feminism of Justice O'Connor, 32 IND. L. 
REV. 1219 (1999). 
183. There arc various shades of originalism reflected in Gruller, ranging from Chief 
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ence to precedent, 184 and the view that judges should play a 
limited role in the lawmaking process. 185 These themes are most 
strongly identified in the opinions of Chief Justice Truepenny 
and Justice Keen. For example, Chief Justice Truepenny made 
it absolutely clear that regardless of the Court's sympathies, the 
Newgarth statute permits no exceptions and that the only 
proper outcome is thus to affirm the convictions. 186 Hoping the 
Chief Executive would intervene and grant clemency, but un-
willing to accomplish the same result indirectly, the Chief Jus-
tice evinced a preference for a literal reading of the text and for 
a constrained judiciary. Justice Keen adopted an even stricter 
stance, refusin~ to consider what the Chief Executive "may or 
may not do" 1 and reminding his colleagues that the "sole 
question" before the Court is "whether these defendants did, 
within the meaning of [the statute], willfully take the life of 
[another]." 188 In answering this question, Justice Keen put aside 
his "personal predilections" 189 and instead called for a faithful 
and honest adherence to the statute. 
The preference for a nonactivist court is best illustrated by 
the discontent expressed in all four dissenting opinions in Grutter 
over the majority's unprincipled and flawed application of the 
Court's strict scrutiny standard. For example, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist criticized the majority for its lenient application of the 
strict scrutiny test, faulting the majority for failing to follow prior 
case law and instead giving "unprecedented deference" to the 
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia's "conservative originalism" to Justice Thomas's 
"liberal originalism." See SCOTI D. GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE 
OF CLARENCE THOMAS (1999); John C. Eastman, Taking Justice Thomas Seriously, 2 
GREEN BAG 2D 425 (1999) (reviewing SCOTI D. GERBER, supra); Joel Friedlander, Jus-
tice Thomas: An Early Re1rospective, 17 DEL. LAw. 28 (Fall 1999). 
184. Although generally associated with conservative judicial philosophies, adher-
ence to stare decisis is not exclusively a conservative doctrine and is not reflexively em-
braced by conservative judges. See Earl M. Maltz, No Rules in a Knife Fight: Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and the Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 669 (1994) (arguing that in 
certain situations it is appropriate for conservative judges not to follow precedent); Mi-
chael Stokes Paulsen, Captain lames T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Judicia/Interpretation: 
Some Modest Proposals from the Twenty Third Cenwry, 59 ALBANY L. REV. 671, 679-81 
(1995) (referring to stare decisis .iS ·'a hoax designed to provide cover for a particular 
outcome, not a genuine, principled ground of decision"). 
185. See David M. Zlotnick, Justice Scalia and His Critics: An Exploration of Scalia's 
Fidelity to His Constitutionai Methodology, 48 EMORY L.J. 1377, 1383 (1999) (describing 
the appropriate role of judicial review in a constitutional democracy as one in which 
judges follow democratically sanctioned legislative commands). 
186. Fuller, supra note 1, at 619. 
187. /d. at 632. 
188. !d. 
189. /d. 
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Law School. 190 The Chief Justice's criticism was twofold. First, the 
majority improperly redefined strict scrutiny in contrast with prior 
cases in which the Court had consistently rejected arguments that 
a more lenient application of strict scrutiny should be used in 
cases where the defendant has claimed racial classifications were 
being used in a benign way, or in cases involving "special" settings 
such as educational institutions. 191 Second, the majority's incom-
plete and faulty analysis of the data before the Court allowed the 
Law School to engage in the type of racial balancing that the 
Court itself has called "patently unconstitutional." 192 In particular, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the majority for ignoring the 
fact that the percentage of what constitutes a critical mass varied 
among the various minority groups and that the correlation be-
tween the percentage of the Law School's pool of applicants who 
were members of the various minority groups and the percentage 
of the admitted applicants who were members of those same 
groups was "too precise." 193 In the end, the Chief Justice equated 
the Law School's policy to a quota system.194 
Given the stern nature of this criticism, it is curious to hear 
the same complaint lodged against Chief Justice Rehnquist re-
garding a decision he authored less than a month earlier. In Ne-
vada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 195 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist wrote for the majority that Congress has the power 
under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to authorize suits 
against state governments for violating the Family and Medical 
Leave Act. 196 The outcome was surprising because in recent cases 
the Court has refused to allow lawsuits against nonconsenting 
states for violations of a variety of federallaws, 197 and any distinc-
tion between those cases and Hibbs is perplexing. 198 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion in Hibbs had the same "flaws" he attributes 
to the majority opinion in Grutter. First, by relaxing the showing 
190. 539 U.S. 306,379-80 (2003). 
191. /d. 
192. /d. at 386. 
193. /d. at 383. 
194. /d. at 386. 
195. 538 U.S. 731 (2003). 
196. 29 u .S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (200.l). 
197. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) 
(Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimmel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) 
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (Rcli-
l!ious Freedom Restoration Act). 
- 198. See Vikram David A mar, The New "New Federalism": The Supreme Court in 
Hibbs (and Guillen), 6 GREEN BAG 2D 349, 350 (2003); Erwin Chemerinsky, October 
Term 2002: Value Choices by the Justices, Not Theory, Determine Constitutional Law, 6 
GREEN BAG 2D 367,374 (2003). 
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that Congress must make regarding the unconstitutional state 
conduct that warrants congressional action to permit lawsuits 
against nonconsenting states, the Chief Justice redefined the stan-
dard the Court had established in very recent cases. Second, the 
Chief Justice engaged in incomplete and faulty analysis of data: in 
deciding whether Congress had shown that the states were en-
gaged in unconstitutional conduct, Chief Justice Rehnquist ap-
proved Congress's reliance on evidence of sex discrimination in 
the development of leave policies by private employers (as op-
posed to public employers), of discrimination regarding parental 
leave (as opposed to family leave), and of discrimination by other 
states (as opposed to the state involved in the dispute). This re-
laxation of the existing doctrine has been criticized for 9iving too 
much flexibility to Congress, contrary to clear precedent. 99 
At first glance, the Chief Justice's inconsistency in these two 
cases smacks of judicial arrogance. Why was he willing to ma-
nipulate the established constitutional standard in Hibbs (to al-
low Congress more flexibility in dealing with gender discrimina-
tion in family leave) but not in Grutter (to allow Michigan more 
flexibili~ in dealing with affirmative action in law school admis-
sions)?2 A short, often overlooked passage in The Case of the 
Speluncean Explorers provides a useful insight. 
Justice Handy's opinion was based on two lessons drawn 
from personal experience. First, he dismissed the possibility of 
executive clemency based on gossip from his wife's niece (a 
friend of the Chief Executive's secretary). Second, he compared 
the explorers' case to the first case he heard as a trial judge, in 
which he was "widely approved by the gress and the public opin-
ion" for employing his common sense. 1 A similar dynamic may 
have been at work in Hibbs. 
A recent New York Times article questioned the Chief Jus-
tice's "solicitude for the usefulness of the FMLA in erasing the per-
199. See Amar, supra note 1lJ8, at 353-54. 
200. The decision in Hibbs, although at odds with the Court's most recent federalism 
decisions, arguably is consistent with the Chief Justice's broader judicial philosophy. See 
Thomas W. Merrill, Chief Jusrice Rehnquisr, Pluralisr Theory, and rhe Inrerprerarion of 
Srarwes, 25 RUTGERS L.J. 621, 622 (1lJlJ4) (describing the Chid Justice's underlying the-
ory "as a species of pluralism," in which the political system is perceived "as one in which 
competing groups seck to advance private interests through bargaining and compro-
mise"); cf Mark V. Tushnct, A Republican Chief Jusrice, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1326, 1328 
(llJlJO) ("One could account for perhaps ninety percent of Chief Justice Rehnquist's bot-
tom-line results by lookmg, not at anything in the United States Reports, but rather at 
the platforms of the Republican Party"). 
20 I. See Fuller, supra note I, at 643-44. 
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vasive sex-role stereotype that caring for family members is 
women's work."202 The article suggested that this newfound interest 
might have something to do with the Chief Justice's family situa-
tion: when his daughter experienced child-care problems, the Chief 
Justice often "left work early to pick up his granddaughters from 
school."203 Unlike Justice Handy's candid reference to his personal 
experiences, the Chief Justice's motivation was not transparent; we 
likely will never know whether his firsthand experience with child-
care affected his position in Hibbs. If humble judging involves "a 
willingness to suspend belief, at least provisionally, in the correct-
ness of one's own opinions," perhaps we can hope that the Chief 
Justice's change of heart in Hibbs indicates a willingness to be a bit 
more humble, or at least a bit more human. 204 
In addition to his textualist critique in The Case of the Spe-
luncean Explorers, Justice Keen also discussed the negative prac-
tical implications in future cases of reversing the convictions of 
the explorers. Justice Scalia raised similar concerns regarding the 
likely effects of the Court's decision in Grutter. He argued that 
the majority's subversion of the constitutional strict scrutiny 
standard is likeli to generate much future litigation in racial 
preference cases. 05 
The most interesting connection between Justice Scalia and 
the justices of the Newgarth Supreme Court, however, relates 
not to substance, but to style. The academic commentary on Jus-
tice Scalia focuses almost exclusively on identifying his various 
theories of constitutional interpretation, statutory construction, 
or deference to administrative agencies.206 Very little is made of 
the style of his judicial writings. Erwin Chemerinsky recently has 
202. See Linda Greenhouse, Heartfelt Words from the Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 6, 2003, § 4, at 3. 
203. !d. 
204. See McConnell, supra note 137, at 1292. 
205. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 348-40 (2lXl3); see Zlotnick, supra note 185, 
at 1385 (noting that Justice Scalia has repeatedly warned the Court of the danger to the 
Court and the Constitution of letting judges implement their own values). 
206. See generally J. Richard Broughton, The Jurisprudence of Tradition and Justice 
Scalia's Unwrillen Constitution, 103 W.VA. L. REV. 19 (2000); JayS. Bybee, Printz, The 
Unitary Execwive, and the Fire in the Trash Can: Has Justice Scalia Picked the Court's 
Pocket?, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 269 (2001); Bradford C. Clark, The Constitlllional Struc-
wre and the Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia, 47 ST. LOUIS. U. L.J. 753 (2003); Autumn Fox & 
Stephen R. McAllister, An Eagle Soaring: The Jurisprudence of Justice Antonin Scalia, 19 
CAMPBELL L. REV. 223 (1997); David Luban, Legal Traditionalism, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1035 
(1991); A.C. Pritchard & Todd J. Zywicki, Finding the Constitution: An Economic Analysis 
of Tradition's Role in Constitlllionallnterpretation, 77 N.C. L. REV. 409 (1999); SymposiUm, 
Reflecting on Justice Antonin Scalia's Religion Clause Jurisprudence, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 1 
(2000); Symposium, Justice Antonin Scalia, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 425 (2003). 
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taken Justice Scalia to task for his "frequent sarcasm and 
pointed attacks on his colleagues. "207 Among the many examples 
cited by Professor Chemerinsky are Justice Scalia's references to 
other Justices' opinions as "nothing short of ludicrous," "beyond 
absurd," "entirely irrational," "nothing short of preposterous," 
"ridiculous," and "so unsupported in reason and so absurd in 
application [as] unlikely to survive. "208 Professor Chemerinsky 
argues that such rhetoric "sends exactly the wrong message ... 
about what type of discourse is appropriate in a formal legal set-
ting, and how it is acceptable to speak to one another."209 
In Grutter, Justice Scalia does not shy away from his charac-
teristically combative rhetoric. He referred to the Law School's 
"critical mass" justification as both "mystical"210 and "fabled."211 
The critical mass concept, he argued, when used as a justification 
for racial preferences "challenges even the most gullible 
mind."212 In yet more sarcastic language, Justice Scalia noted 
that the benefit the Law School allegedly derives from diver-
sity-"cross racial understanding"-is not the kind of benefit on 
which law students are graded ("Works and Plays Well with 
Others: B+")213 or tested on bar examinations ("Q: Describe in 
500 words or less your cross-racial understandings").214 
Although virtually overlooked, inflamed rhetoric and sar-
casm found their way onto the Newgarth Supreme Court. For ex-
ample, in a passafe whose racial implications have been discussed 
by Paul Butler/ 1 Justice Foster referred to the "stupidest house-
maid." In arguing that it is proper for judges to "read between the 
lines" when interpreting statutes, Justice Foster noted that the 
"stupidest housemaid knows that when she is told 'to peel the 
soup and skim the potatoes' her mistress does not mean what she 
says."216 Even more pointed Scalia-like language is found in other 
opinions. Justice Keen referred to Justice Foster's opinion as "po-
etic," but full of "fantasy."217 He argued that Justice Foster used 
207. Erwin Chcmcrinsky, The Jurisprudence of Justice Scalia: A Critical Appraisal, 
22 U. HAW. L. REV. 385,386 (2000). 
208. /d. at 400. 
209. /d. at 399. 
210. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346. 
211. /d. at 347. 
212. !d. 
213. /d. 
214. !d. 
215. Paul Butler, Stupidest Housemaid, f., Harvard Spcluncean Symposium, supra 
note 7, at 1917-23. 
216. Fuller, supra note 1, at 625. 
217. /d. at 632. 
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his purposive approach to statutory construction in so many con-
texts that, in the event of Justice Foster's incapacity, Justice Keen 
"could write a satisfactory opinion for him without any prompting 
whatever, beyond being informed whether he likes the effect of 
the terms of the statute as applied to the case before him. "218 Ac-
cording to Justice Keen, Justice Foster's approach is unprincipled 
and simple-minded because it is both outcome-driven and overly 
mechanical. Justice Keen concluded by criticizing "[t]he essential 
shabbiness" of Justice Foster's attempt to rewrite the Newgarth 
murder statute as incompatible with the proper role that judges 
should play in the legal system.219 
Another example of sarcasm in The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers is found in a passage reminiscent of Justice Scalia, in 
which Justice Handy criticized the Newgarth Supreme Court for 
throwing "an obscuring curtain of legalisms about every issue 
presented to them for decision. "220 After listing some examples 
of these "obscuring" legalisms (positive law, law of nature, pur-
pose of the statute), Justice Handy concluded: "My only disap-
pointment was that someone did not raise the question of the le-
gal nature of the bargain struck in the case-whether it was 
unilateral or bilateral, and whether [the victim] could not be 
considered as having revoked an offer prior to action taken 
thereunder. "221 
"Streaks of meanness" thus are no strangers to the United 
States Supreme Court or to the fictional Supreme Court of New-
garth. Such sarcasm has no place in a jurisprudence of humility, 
and inflamed rhetoric can be an indicator of bad judging. The 
type of rhetoric used by Justice Scalia and by the fictional Jus-
tices Foster and Keen is problematic in at least two ways. 
First, such rhetoric is symptomatic of individuals who be-
lieve they possess a monopoly on wisdom.222 Judges with such 
views are less willing to engage their brethren in earnest debate 
because they feel they have little to learn from others. Judges 
who isolate themselves are freer to offend their colleagues with 
inflamed rhetoric. 213 
218. /d. 
219. !d. at 636. 
220. /d. at 637. 
221. /d. 
222. See Sherry, supra note 151, at 805. 
223. Sally J. Kenney, Puppeceers or Agencs? Whac Lazarus's CLOSED CHAMBERS 
Adds To Our Underscanding of Law Clerks ac che U.S. Supreme Courc, 25 LAW & Soc. 
!!'IQUIRY 185, 221 (20<Xl) ("When justices isolate themselves from one another ... it is 
harder for the Court to function as an institution"). 
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Second, a jurisprudence of humility requires a particular 
manner of relating to and treating others. Humble judges will 
make a concerted effort to avoid humiliating those in their pres-
ence by showing both courtesy and respect.224 This humility 
manifests itself as better treatment of parties and their judicial 
~olleag~es.225 Although we. of course do not know the 2~6ersonal 
mteract10ns among the vanous members of the Court, - we do 
know that the kind of rhetoric used by Justice Scalia is not con-
ducive to an atmosphere of respect and does not belong in a ju-
risprudence of humility. 
Consistent with his conservative judicial philosophy,227 Jus-
tice Thomas also strongly criticized the majority's opinion in 
Grutter on doctrinal grounds. He argued that the Court's prece-
dents clearly indicate that only actions taken by the state "to 
provide a bulwark against anarchy, or to prevent violence" sat-
isfy the compelling interest prong of strict scrutiny in matters of 
racial classifications228 and that the Law School's "facile" interest 
fails this test.229 Justice Thomas also criticized the majority's ap-
plication of the narrow tailoring prong, calling it "conclusory" 
and devoid of any "serious effort" to explain the connection be-
tween the use of racial classifications and the interest pressed by 
the Law School.230 
Following his doctrinal critique, Justice Thomas unleashed 
an even sharper "personal" commentary on the stigmatizing ef-
fect of affirmative action on members of minority groups who 
are presumed to be unworthy of admission to the University of 
224. See Scharffs, mpra note 141, at 195. 
225. /d. 
226. The most detailed depiction of the inner workings of the Court is EDWARD 
LAZARUS, CLOSED CHAMBERS: THE FIRST EYEWITI"ESS ACCOUNT OF THE EPIC 
STRUGGLES INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1998). For some of the commentary on 
CLOSED CHAMBERS, sec THE FORGOTIEN MEMOIR OF JOHN KI"OX: A YEAR IN THE 
LIFE OF A SUPREME COURT CLERK IN FDR's WASHII"GTON (David J. Garrow & Dennis 
J. Hutchinson, cds., 2002); Erwin Chcmcrinsky, Opening Closed Chambers, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1087 (1999); Barry Cushman, Clerking for Scrooge, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 721 (2(X)3); 
David J. Garrow, Dissenting Opinion: A Witness from Inside the Supreme Court is Not 
Impressed, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1998, at 26; David J. Garrow, "The Lowest Form of 
Animal Life"?: Supreme Court Clerks and Supreme Court History, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 
855 (1999); Alex Kozinski, Conduct Unbecoming, 108 YALE L.J. 835 (1999); Richard W 
Painter, Matter of Ethics: Open Chambers?, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1430 (1999). 
227. For commentary on Justice Thomas's jurisprudence, sec Symposium, Clarence 
Thomas After Ten Years: Some Reflections, 10 AM. U. J. GE:\DER, Soc. PoL'Y & L. 327 
(2002); Symposium, A Tribute to Justice Clarence Thomas, 12 REGE:\T U. L. REV. 333 
(2000); supra note 183. 
228. Gruttcr v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 353 (2003). 
229. !d. at 355. 
230. !d. at 356-57. 
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Michigan Law School. Reminiscent of his dissenting opinion in 
an earlier school desegregation case,231 Justice Thomas began his 
Grutter dissent with a pointed quote from Frederick Douglass 
regarding the treatment of African-Americans by "well-
intentioned" whites.232 This portion of Justice Thomas's opinion 
is similar not to the conservative bloc in the Newgarth Court, 
which voted to affirm the convictions, but rather to Justice Fos-
ter, who voted to reverse the convictions on the basis of his 
paean to a liberal judicial philosophy. Justice Foster used his 
own view of morality in arguing that when trapped in the cave, 
the explorers were outside the laws of Newgarth and effectively 
in a "state of nature. "233 This incursion onto moral ground al-
lowed Justice Foster to argue that judges should first divine and 
then apply the legislature's purpose in enacting a statute.234 Be-
cause the explorers were in such an extreme situation, they were 
outside the reach of the law, and the Newgarth Court should ac-
cordingly have stepped outside the confines of the law as well to 
decide their fate. 
Like Justice Foster, Justice Thomas looked inward to sup-
port his preferred outcome and focused on what appear to be his 
own feelings and experiences with affirmative action. Justice 
Thomas's personal commentary made the same appeal with re-
spect to race as Justice Foster's exegesis on a "state of nature." 
In both cases, the Justices argued that the situation at hand is ex-
treme. Justice Thomas suggested that because race is such a per-
vasive societal concern, it is of a completely different nature than 
other legal problems. Yet while Justice Foster fashioned an ex-
trajudicial remedy in ignoring standard legal doctrine to deal 
with the unique problems associated with human cannibalism, 
Justice Thomas responded to the special problems of racial pref-
erences by enthusiastically embracing the doctrinal niceties of 
strict scrutiny.235 
Although they proposed very different solutions to the "ex-
treme" problems with which they were presented, neither Justice 
231. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 114 (1995) (Thomas, J. concurring) ("It never 
ceases to amaze me that the courts arc so willing to assume that anything that is pre-
dominantly black must be inferior."). 
232. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 350. 
233. See Fuller, supra note 1, at 621. 
234. See George Washington Speluncean Symposium, supra note 7, at 1742. 
235. Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion is based on the same view of the unique-
ness of the race problem. "It is well documented that conscious and unconscious race 
bias even rank discrimination based on race, remain alive in our land, impending realiza-
tion,of our highest values and ideals." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 345. 
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Foster nor Justice Thomas exhibited much humility. By adhering 
to his own personal moral views (in the case of Justice Foster) or 
to his own personal views on how African-Americans feel stig-
matized by the use of affirmative action (in the case of Justice 
Thomas), both Justices failed to "doubt themselves and to risk 
being wrong. "236 Both thus showed a streak of arrogance rather 
than of humility. 
Justice Kennedy's opinion is the most Tatting-like of the 
four Grutter dissents. Justice Kennedy argued that the majority's 
effective abandonment of strict scrutiny analysis will eliminate 
any incentive for government officials at educational institutions 
to fashion the race-neutral admissions policies to which all of the 
Justices in Grutter purportedly aspired to. In particular, noted 
Justice Kennedy, "[b]y deferring to the law school's choice of 
minority admissions programs, the courts will lose the talents 
and resources of the faculties and administrators in devising new 
and fairer ways to ensure individual consideration."237 University 
administrators consequently will have "few incentives" to make 
their minority admission programs "transparent and protective 
of individual review. "238 
Of greater concern to Justice Kennedy, however, was the ef-
fect of the Court's decision on its ability to participate in the con-
tinuing development of public policy regarding racial classifications. 
By abandoning or manipulating strict scrutiny analysis, the Court 
loses authority to approve the use of race and thus diminishes its 
role in this important national debate. Justice Kennedy concluded 
by noting how the Court's holding affects him as a judge: "If the 
Court abdicates its constitutional duty to give strict scrutiny to the 
use of race in university admissions, it negates my authority to ap-
prove the use of race in pursuit of student diversity. "239 
Although all of the Justices in The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers purported to be concerned about judicial legitimacy, 
Justice Tatting's approach best preserved the Supreme Court of 
Newgarth's judicial role in the special circumstances posed by 
human cannibalism. A review of the commentary and later opin-
ions on the hypothetical reveals that the decision of whether to 
affirm or reverse the convictions was a doctrinally difficult and 
normatively contentious issue. For example, the most recent 
236. See Sherry, supra note 151, at810. 
237. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 393. 
238. !d. al 394. 
239. !d. at395 (emphasis added). 
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symposium on The Case of the Speluncean Explorers resulted in 
a 3-3 tie vote on whether to affirm the convictions of the explor-
ers.240 Justice Tatting thus faced a "hard" decision. On the one 
hand, siding with Justices Foster and Handy to reverse the con-
victions would have been the popular course of action, but at a 
very high cost to legal doctrine (by stretching the scope of the 
murder statute) and to the reputation of the court as a principled 
institution guided by law and not popular will. On the other 
hand, joining Chief Justice Truepenny and Justice Keen to af-
firm the convictions also would have damaged legal doctrine (by 
freezing the reach of the murder statute) and the court's reputa-
tion. Justice Tatting's withdrawal got the Court "off the hook." 
The Court no longer commanded the floor. Instead, the Chief 
Executive, the head of a branch more comfortable in the politi-
cal arena, took center stage. The Court also avoided manipulat-
ing doctrine in the context of a very difficult case, leaving doc-
trinal changes to future cases of a less polarizing nature and thus 
more conducive to extensive and reflective debate. 
Yet Justice Tatting's approach was not without cost. The 
decision to withdraw meant, as Justice Handy reminded the 
Newgarth Court, an affirmance of the death sentence imposed 
by the lower court. The failure by Justice Tatting to decide could 
on itself be viewed as a failure, having the potential of diminish-
ing the reputation of the institution. 
Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy's approach in Grutter (and, as 
we argue later, in Lawrence) presents the truest jurisprudence of 
humility. In Grutter, Justice Kennedy both recognized the impor-
tance of diversity and demanded fidelity to the Court's strict 
scrutiny doctrine, which would leave the special problems posed 
by racial preferences in admissions in the hands of the very offi-
cials given such latitude by the majority. This approach is consis-
tent with Justice Kennedy's overall judicial philosophy, recently 
described as "a beautiful synthesis of principled legalism and 
honest realism."241 Although he prefers not to create new consti-
tutional principles, Justice Kennedy is willing to adapt old ones 
to new contexts.242 He cares deeply about providing citizens with 
"places where diverse 12eople come together to democratically 
discuss and deliberate,"243 as well as keeping citizens informed, 
240. See Harvard Spelunccan Symposium, supra note 7, at 1842. 
241. See Akhil Reed Amar, Juslice Kennedy and the Ideal of Equality, 28 PAC. L.J. 
515,520 (1997). 
242. !d. 
243. !d. at 532. 
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in as clear and accessible language as possible, of the important 
debates facing the Court and the country?44 
Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion in Grutter and major-
ity opinion in Lawrence reflect a humble, yet courageous, ap-
proach to judging. His humility is illustrated in Grutter in two 
ways. Justice Kennedy recognized that in the university setting 
people from all walks of life "will talk to and learn from each 
other face-to-face as democratic equals, "245 and thus began his 
opinion with unquestionable support for diversity in higher edu-
cation. "Our precedents provide a basis for the Court's accep-
tance of a university's considered judgment that racial diversity 
among students can further its educational task, when supported 
by empirical evidence. "246 Indeed, Justice Kennedy's acceptance 
of diversity as a compelling state interest, appears to be the rea-
son why none of the other dissenters joined his opinion. He la-
mented that the result of the majority's decision will be to lose 
"the talents and resources of the faculties and administrators in 
devising new and fairer wa.xs to ensure individual consideration" 
in the admissions process. 2 
Justice Kennedy's humility, however, is infused with coura-
geousness. Although Justice Kennedy is willing to defer to gov-
ernment officials, he was unwilling in Grutter to abdicate his 
"constitutional duty to Bive strict scrutiny to the use of race in 
university admissions. ,As He thus demonstrated his courage 
through his unwillingness to bend doctrine to achieve the politi-
cally expedient and popular result. Perhaps Justice Kennedy 
now can shed the "Greenhouse Effect" moniker that has dogged 
him since his early years on the Court. 249 Similarly, Justice Ken-
nedy in Lawrence refused to manipulate the doctrinal underpin-
nings of Bowers v. Hardwic/!50 and instead confronted the de-
244. /d. at 526; see also Neal K. Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REv. 
1709, 1801 (1998) (discussing the importance of judges addressing the public at large in 
their opinions). 
245. See Amar, supra note 241, at 532; Akhil Reed Amar & Neal Kumar Katyal, 
Bakke's Fate, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1745 (1996). 
246. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 387-88 (2(X)3). 
247. /d. at 393. 
248. !d. at 395. 
249. See supra note 133; for articles labeling Justice Kennedy as the Justice most 
prone to this malady, sec Boot, supra note 168; Tony Mauro, "Kennedy Court" Ponders 
Net Case, USA TODAY, Mar. 19, 1997, at 3A ("When conservative federal Judge Laur-
ence Silberman decried the 'Greenhouse Effect' on his colleagues-named for New York 
Times court correspondent Linda Greenhouse, a presumed liberal-many think he had 
Kennedy in mind"). 
250. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
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mands of stare decisis head on: "Bowers was not correct when it 
was decided, and is not correct today."251 
Like Justice Tatting in The Case of the Speluncean Explor-
ers, Justice Kennedy cares deeply about both the Court's reputa-
tion and the democratic values advanced by the Court's deci-
sions. In Grutter and Lawrence, Justice Kennedy navigates a 
course, through both dissenting and majority opinions with a ju-
risprudence of humilit~ as his compass, which other judicial ex-
plorers should follow. 2 2 
CONCLUSION 
As a tax law professor and a labor law professor using a ju-
risprudence of humility to help explain the Court's recent land-
mark affirmative action decision in the context of Lon Fuller's 
masterful hypothetical that has challenged and perplexed stu-
dents and scholars for generations, we complete the task with an 
even keener sense of humility than when we undertook this pro-
ject. But we also believe our effort here draws strength from two 
recent strands in legal scholarship. 
First, thoughtful books by Richard Fallon253 and Daniel 
Farber and Suzanna Sherrf54 argue that the search for grand 
theory does not contribute to our understanding of how actual 
judges decide actual cases.255 For all their intellectual brilliance, 
251. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. at 2472, 2484 (2003). 
252. Of course, we have not exhausted the possible connections between The Case of 
the Speluncean Explorers and Grutter. Indeed, in our Introduction to Law classes in Fall 
2003, we asked our incoming first year students to write a paper on which opinions in the 
two cases reOectthe best jurisprudential match. The students surprised us with a number 
of interesting jurisprudential connections (we did not require the students to read all of 
the opinions in Grutter): 
Jurisprudential "Matches" in The Case of the Speluncean Explorers and Grutter 
University of Cincinnati College of Law Class of 2006 
Trucpenny Keen Foster Handy Tatting 
O'Connor 2 20 11 
Rchnquist 2 
Scalia 1 7 2 3 
Thomas 4 29 2 2 4 
253. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION (2001). 
254. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING 
CERTAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002). 
255. See also Robert J. Martineau, Craft and Technique, Not Canons and Grand 
Theories: A Neo-Realist View of Stallttory Construction, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 41 
(1993) ("Those who develop grand theories of statutory construction, either to explain 
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purveyors of such theories are doomed to fail because our courts 
"are simply too wildly messy-too beautifully, incongruously 
complicated-to be captured in any elegant theory."256 Instead, 
we should focus our attention on the day-to-day role of judges as 
"practical lawyers, trying to find workable solutions to institu-
tional, structural, and political difficulties. "257 We agree with An-
thony D'Amato who, in discussing The Case of the Speluncean 
Explorers, notes that we too often focus on judicial decisionmak-
ing as opposed to a judge's decisionmaking.258 Instead, "the es-
sence of the lawler's craft is not to learn theories but to per-
suade judges. "25 A jurisprudence of humility brings these 
"institutional, structural, and political difficulties" into the 
sunlight for all to see and, in the process, both constrain judges 
in deciding individual cases and guide lawyers in future cases. 
Second, William Stuntz makes a plea for greater humility on 
the part of law professors because "we know less than we claim 
to know, and we are not as smart as we claim to be."260 He ob-
serves that "[o]ur theories may be beautiful things to behold (if 
anything published in a law review can fairly be called a thing of 
beauty), but they tend to ignore a great deal of messy reality-
especially the reality of our own limits. "261 Professor Stuntz 
writes in the context of a Christian perspective on law which we 
share. Like Justices Foster and Thomas, whose personal experi-
ences inform their judicial decisionmaking, our Christian faith 
informs our work as well. We heed the prophet Micah's advice 
to "[DJo justice, and to love kindness and walk humbly with your 
God." 62 We believe that a focus on humility has much to offer, 
regardless of one's religious faith (if any). We agree with Profes-
the values on which judges actually decide how to construe statutes or to advocate the 
values on which judges should construe them, not only confuse technique with theory but 
attempt to create values out of mere technique."). 
256. Steven D. Smith, Desperately Seeking Serenity, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 523, 526 
(2002) (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, supra note 254). 
257. Brian H. Bix, Practical Judging, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 453, 454 (2002) (review-
ing FALLON, supra note 253). 
258. Anthony D'Amato, The Effect of Legal Theories on Judicial Decisions, 74 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 517, 526 (1999); see also Martineau, supra note 255, at 40 (distinguishing 
judicial decisionmaking from decision-justifying). 
259. D'Amato, supra note 258, at 526. For further discussion of lawyering as a craft, 
sec Brett G. Scharffs, Law as Craft, 54 VAND. L. REV. 2245 (2001 ). 
260. William J. Stuntz, Christian Legal Theory, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1707,1741 (2003) 
(reviewing CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W. McConnell & 
Robert F. Cochran ct al., cds. 2(Xll)). 
261. /d . 
. 262. MICAH 6:8. See also Scharffs, supra note 141, at 147-57 (discussing the applica-
llon of th1s passage to the act of judging). 
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sor Stuntz that we should approach difficult legal issues with 
both caution ("acknowledging that one might not be weighing 
costs and benefits ~uite right, there is usually a case to be made 
on the other side") 63 and modesty ("paying attention to the pos-
sibility that other institutions might be able to contribute more 
to solvin~ the problem at hand than could lawyers and 
courts").2 A jurisprudence of humility, extending beyond the 
law professoriate to both judges and lawyers, at least motivates 
us to ask the right questions even if we do not agree on the an-
swers. We cannot improve on Professor Stuntz's conclusion: 
Humility does not counsel inaction, and it is not a posture of 
indifference. Rather, humility always sees the possibility of its 
own mistake. That implies not blindness to the errors and in-
justices that attend the status quo, but awareness that pro-
posed solutions must be tentative, subject to revision as ex-
perience dictates .... [It is a ] combination of a strong desire 
to do justice with an equally strong sense of the limited vision 
of those of us who seek to remold the justice system. And it is 
unpredictable- neither clear~ liberal nor clearly conservative 
nor inevitably anything else. 2 
263. Stuntz, supra note 260 at 1744. 
264. /d. 
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